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Gender reassignment procedures are performedfor the treatment ofthe
gender dysphoria syndrome (transsexualism). Although this modality of
treatment is therapeutic in nature and therefore not contra bonos mores, the
legal status ofthe post-operative transsexual remains that ofhis/her
previous sex. The purpose ofthe gender reassignment procedures is that of
acceptance within the community as a person ofthe sex indicated by his/her
changed appearance. Nothing will be achieved by the successful completion
oftreatment ifthe person's changed sexual appearance is not recognised by
the law as a change in sexual status as well.
The law, by keeping aloofofthe problem ofthe post-operative transsexual,
has created a legal "vacuum" where there is social andjudicial acceptance
ofreassignment procedures, but a refusal to give legal effect to the change
in status that the transsexual obsessively desires and the operation
simulates.
This work will analyse the medical issues associated with gender
reassignment procedures. The legal status ofthe transsexual after
reassignment procedures will be explored, and in doing so, the human rights
violations with which such people have to contend, will be highlighted. The
constitutionality ofthe lack ofa legal recognition ofthe post-operative
transsexual's sexual status will be examined. It will be shown that there are
compelling reasons for legislation to be introduced as a matter ofurgency to
safeguard the fundamental rights ofthe post-operative transsexual.
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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONDITION
OF TRANSSEXUALISM AND GENDER
REASSIGNMENT PROCEDURES
1.1: INTRODUCTION
Medical sciences have advanced extensively during the previous century.
The legal fraternity has likewise tried to keep abreast of these advancements
and to respond to emerging challenges. However, in the case of
transsexualism, (the gender dysphoria syndrome), the legal position of the
patient post-reassignment procedures, is far from clear. In some areas of the
law sex is of critical importance, and it is necessary to ask if the law should
follow suit when advances in medical sciences disturb the traditional point
of view. 1
Acceptance by society of transsexuals has been lagging and perhaps, there
has been a deliberate attempt by the public to curb their presence and to
1. P.1. Thomas "Can The Lawyer Keep Up With The Doctor?" (1980) 97 SALJ 7.
2
coerce them into continuing their twilight zone existence. It is to this
public that the architects of law belong. The nature of the legal system is
such that judges and magistrates play an important role in determining the
outcome of processes in which all citizens use the legal system to protect
their rights. In a subtle way, the personalities ofjudges and magistrates, as
well as their schooling, university education, professional experience,
personal political beliefs and their backgrounds in general, influence the way
in which they interpret legislation.2
The purpose of the surgical and medical treatment that a person undergoes to
change his or her sex is that of acceptance within the community in which
that person lives, as a person of the sex indicated by his or her changed
appearance.3 Nothing will be achieved by the successful completion of
2. Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre To End Violence Against Women National Legal Manual For
Counsellors OfRaped And Battered Women (1999) 140.
3. South African Law Commission (hereafter SALC) Report On The Investigation Into The Legal
Consequences Of Sexual Realignment And Related Matters Project 52 (1995) 1.
3
treatment if the person's changed sexual appearance is not recognized by the
law as a change in sexual status as well.4 The transsexual has therefore to
cope with the various resultant legal anomalies as a consequence of a lack of
such recognition.
1.2: AIM OF THE DISSERTATION
The aim of this dissertation is to consider the legal status of the transsexual
after reassignment procedures, and in doing so, to highlight the human rights
violations with which such people have to contend.
The constitutionality of legislature pertaining to various legal aspects after
treatment will be examined. In addition, medico-Iegal issues with respect to
the hormonal and operative treatment of the transsexual will be discussed.
It is important to remember that prior to the demise ofApartheid and the
introduction of a constitutional order, the South African legal system was
4. sALe (1995) op cit 1.
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defmed according to the values and interests ofwhite, middle-class, middle-
aged heterosexual males. 5 The constitutional order has created a democratic,
political, legal and intellectual climate for the exchange of ideas and for the
challenging of cultural and ideological hegemony that could have been
carried over from a legacy that ignored diversity and pluralism.6
Prior to any ethical or legal discussions, an appraisal of normal sexual
differentiation and the defmition of sex, together with the biological
condition of transsexualism and its treatment are appropriate. The meanings
of gender identity, and sexual orientation need to be understood. This will
allow the reader to comprehend the differences between these terms and
thereby enable her/him to distinguish the differences between the
transsexual, transvestite, homosexual and hermaphrodite in order to avoid
confusion and uncertainty with respect to these various states. This
awareness is a vital prerequisite for the medical and surgical management of
5. T.L. Mosikatsana "The Definitional Exclusion Of Gays And Lesbians From Family Status" (1996) 12
SAJHR549.
6. Mosikatsana op cit 554.
5
the transsexual, so as to avoid gross physical and psychological morbidity,
which would be the consequence of a misdiagnosis of the patient's condition
together with poor patient selection for the gender reassignment procedure.
Terminology with respect to the management of these patients requires
clarification. The meanings of the terms sex change, gender reassignment,
gender realignment, have to be evaluated as they are used interchangeably in
both the legal and medical literature. Strictly speaking, these terms have
differing implications and this may result in confusion amongst the
respective professions. The most appropriate term will be advanced as a
submission for future use.
6
1.3: SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION
The gender identity of a person is defmed as "whether an individual
identifies as a male or a female."7 It is the end result of genetic, hormonal
and morphological sex as influenced by the environment of the individual.8
It includes all behaviour with any sexual connotation, such as body gestures
and mannerisms, habits of speech, recreational preferences and content of
dreams. 9 Sexual expression, both homosexual and heterosexual, can be
regarded as the result of all influences on the individual, both prenatal and
postnatal. 10









2. Gonadal sex. 12
3. The internal genitalia. 13
Th al · al· 144. e extern gemt la.
5. The secondary sexual characteristics that appear at puberty. 15
11. J. Dewhurst in Whitfield C.R.(ed) ''Nonnal And Abnonnal Development Of The Genital Organs"
Dewhurst's Textbook Of Obstetrics And Gynaecology For Postgraduates 4ed (1986) 1. Genetic sex is
equated to chromosomal sex. Sexual development depends initially on the arrangement of the sex
chromosome. Nonnal men have an XY sex chromosome arrangement and nonnal women an XX one.
Chromosomal sex is immutable.
12. ibid. Nonnally if a Y chromosome is present with one or more X chromosomes, testes will form in the
early embryo. If two or more X chromosomes are present without a Y, ovaries will fonn.
13. ibid. If testes form in the early embryo, the individual will develop male genital organs. If testes do not
form, the individual will develop female genital organs whether ovaries are present or not. The internal
genitalia in the female are the fallopian tubes, uterus and upper two-thirds of the vagina and in the
male are the epididymis, vas deferens and seminal vesicles.
14. Dewhurst op cit 3. In the female, these are the lower third of the vagina and the vulva (labia majora,
labia minora and clitoris). External genitalia in the male are the scrotum and the penis.
15. Speroff, Glass and Kase op cit 366. Pubertal sequence in females is: accelerated growth, breast
development, adrenarche (appearance ofaxillary and pubic hair). An adolescent girl's growth spurt
occurs 2 years earlier than that of a boy, whose mean age ofvoice change is 13.5 years.
8
6. The role assigned by society in response to all these external
.~ . f 16manllestatlons 0 sex.
Gender role is heavily influenced by the assignment of the sex of rearing
followed by social interaction based upon genital appearance and the
development of secondary sexual characteristics. 17
Prenatally, sexual differentiation follows a specific sequence of events:
fIrstly, the genetic sex is established, and secondly, under the control of the
genetic sex, the gonads differentiate, determining the hormonal environment
of the embryo, the differentiation of the internal duct systems and the
formation of the external genitalia. 18 It has become apparent that the
16. E. Kahn "The True Hennaphrodite - OfNo Sex?" (1981) 98 SALJ Ill. Assigned gender, i.e. the
gender-psychosocial-style in which the child is brought up as a male or as a female by hislher parents
based on the external genitalia results in the psychological factor. This is a conditioning of the tender
mind of a child over a period of some (usually prepubertal) years to regard himself or herself as the
assigned gender with clothes, lifestyle, friends, expectations etc. appropriate to the parental decision.
17. Speroff, Glass and Kase op cit 328.
18 1. Money, M. Schwartz, V.G. Lewis "Adult Heterosexual Status and Fetal Honnonal Masculinization
and Demasculinization: 46, XX Congenital Virilizing Adrenal Hyperplasia and 46, XY Androgen
Insensitivity Syndrome Compared" (1984) 9 Psychoneuroendocrinology 405.
9
embryonic brain is also sexually differentiated, possibly via a control
mechanism similar to that which determines the sexual development of the
external genitalia, and it has been suggested that the inductive influences of
hormones on the central nervous system may have an effect on the patterns
ofhormone secretion and sexual behaviour in the adult. 19
For the answer to the question as to what the sex of the individual is, the
lawyer has to rely on the doctor. 2o Traditionally, the doctor examines the
external genitalia of the neonate, and accordingly determines the sex,
placing the child into the clearly male or clearly female category, which
distinction the law follows. 21
In Corbett v Corbett (otherwise AsWey)22 the "Ormrod test" was formulated
19. Money, Schwartz and Lewis op cit 405.
20. Thomas op cit 79.
21. ibid.
22. [1970] 2 All ER 33. The court here based its decision entirely on biological criteria. The applicant, a
man who had married a transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment procedures, applied to
court for a decree ofnullity. He declared the marriage was void ab initio or on the grounds of non-
consumation. The court held that the biological criteria and not the psychological factors were
decisive. For the purpose of determining sex any operation should be ignored.
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by the House ofLords to identify the plaintiffs sexual identity.23 This is a
purely biological test requiring the congruence of the person's
chromosomes, gonads and genitalia at the time of the person's birth.
According to the evidence before the court, there was general agreement
among all the medical witnesses on the basic principles and the scientific
facts. 24 All the witnesses accepted there were at least four criteria for an
assessment of an individual's sex: the fITst three being the Ormrod biological
criteria,25 and the fourth, psychological factors. 26
Hence, it can be seen that gender is the expression of one's sex within the
social construct, and this is to an extent fashioned by the patient's psyche.
23. There has been much criticism of the decision in Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) supra and its
attendant Ormrod test from both legal and medical quarters. See inter alia IM.Kennedy,
"Transsexual and Single Sex Marriage"(1973) 2 Anglo-American Law Review 112; G.Brent "Some
Legal Problems of the Post-operative Transsexual" (1972-1973) 12 Journal ofFamily Law 405.
Editorial "Transsexuals in Limbo" (1971) 31 Maryland Law Review 235; W.A.W.Walters
"Transsexualism-Medical and Legal Aspects" (1983) 16 (2) Australian Journal ofForensic Science 65
24. S.A.Strauss Doctor. Patient and the Law 3ed (1991) 234.
25. Thomas op cit 79.
26. ibid.
11
It has been stated that transsexualism represents the ultimate in the
assumption of a sexual identity.27 It is a positive mental state. The individual
wants to be of the opposite sex and actively seeks a coincidence between
hislher physical and psychological sex.28
Sexual orientation has been described as simply the way in which an
individual prefers to practice hislher sexuality and accordingly, the choice
of a male or female partner.29 It does not play a part in the diagnosis of that
person's sex.30Cameron defmes sexual orientation as:
" ... sexual orientation is defined by reference to erotic attraction: in the case of
heterosexuals, to members of the opposite sex; in the case of gays and lesbians, to
members of the same sex. Potentially a homosexual or gay or lesbian person can
therefore be anyone who is erotically attracted to members of his or her own sex.. ,,31
27. lK.Mason, R.A.McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 5 ed. (1999) 37.
28. Mason and McCall Smith op cit 39.
29. ibid.
30. ibid.
31. Cameron E. "Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights" (1993) 110
SAL] 450.
12
It is clear, therefore, that gender identity and sexual orientation differ in
defInition from the biological sex of the individual. Where psychological
factors are incompatible with the biological factors that are responsible for
the determination of sex, the gender dysphoria syndrome, results.
There is no such phenomenon as a true sex change or sexual metamorphosis
as the true biological criteria for sex are immutable and cannot change. It is
submitted that standardized terminology need be adopted and "gender
reassignment" employed in place of all the other terms that are presently
utilized to describe this procedure.
It is not the lawyer's task to go into the merits or details of these criteria, but
the growing significance given to psychological factors has inclined an
increasing number of doctors to the view that gender reassignment surgery
should be accepted by the medical and legal fraternities alike. 32
32. Thomas op cit 79.
13
Transsexuals are often confused with other groups of individuals with
minority sexual inclinations.33 As already stated34 it is vital that the medical
practitioner performs reassignment procedures on the appropriate individual
so as to avoid morbidity from performing surgery on the incorrectly chosen
patient, not to mention the resultant criminal and civil liability that he/she
may incur. Each of these conditions will be examined separately.
1.4: SEXUAL AND GENDER INCONGRUENCY
STATES
The groups that require discussion are: transsexuals; transvestites;
homosexuals and the intersex states. The position of the male child who has
suffered penile amputation at an early age will also be considered.




. d d h . 35 d 36· d' 11Transsexuahsm, or gen er ysp ona syn rome ,IS a me lca y
recognized psychological disorder that has been described as:
"a passionate, life-long conviction that one's psychological gender - that indefinable
feeling ofmaleness or femaleness - is opposite to one's anatomic sex.,,37
This condition, to a transsexual is as real as the awareness and effect of any
serious illness, incurable defect or physical malfonnation of the body, and
the syndrome may manifest itself in various psychotic or neurotic fonns,
leading even to suicide in extreme cases.38 A transsexual is usually
obsessively disgusted by hislher sexual organs, which he/she may seek to
conceal from him/herself, and other persons, as these identify him/her with
35. D. Thompson (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary ged (1995) 424. Dysphoria is defined as "a state of
unease or mental discomfort".
36. Thompson op cit 1413. Syndrome is defined as "a group ofconcurrent symptoms ofa disease."
37. M.M.Belli "Transsexual Surgery" (1978) 239 Journal of the American Medical Association 2143 at
2144; see also MT v JT 355 LR (2d) 204 (1976) at 207.
38. MT v JT supra at 206.
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his/her abhorrent anatomical sex.39 Transsexual males have been known to
amputate their genitalia in an attempt to do SO.40
A transsexual's belief and conviction that he/she is really a member of the
opposite sex imprisoned in the wrong body is constant and inflexible, and
the transsexual's state of mind has been described as follows:
" ... no true transsexual (has) yet been persuaded, bullied, drugged, analysed, shamed,
ridiculed or electrically shocked into (the) acceptance of his physique. It is an immutable
state.... ,,41
39. WS Sahakian Psychopathology Today - The Current Status of Abnormal Psychology 2 ed (1979) 379.
See also Taitz op cit 67 - it is not uncommon for a transsexual to cover his genital area when he baths.
40.1. Randell in R. Green and 1. Money (eds) "Preoperative and Postoperative Status of the Male and
Female Transsexuals" Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (1969) 355. Also see Taitz op cit 67-
68 where he states that in the extreme case, a transsexual may attempt to castrate himself He may
suffer certain psychotic illnesses ego depression, resulting from delusions of sexual guilt which manifest
in an urge to mutilate the genital organs.
41. I. Morris Conundrum (1974) 50.
16
Taitz has suggested, that in order to arrive at a diagnosis of transsexualism,
the following criteria have to be satisfied:42
"(a) the subject has the absolute conviction ofbeing a member of the
opposite sex;
(b) he or she has a strong urge to dress and behave in the manner of a
member of the opposite sex;
(c) the belief ofbeing a member of the sex has constantly persisted from a very early
age, with the relevant corresponding interests and habits of the opposite sex during
normal periods of development;
(d) the urge to behave as a transsexual is not attributable to other causes, for instance
psychosis, homosexuality and play-action."
In the past, the incidence of transsexualism has been reported to be in the
region of 1:100,000.43 However, the SALe Report draws attention to the
fact that the number of transsexuals is not as low as is generally believed,
with the ratio being 1:37,000 of the general population44 with male-to-
42. Taitz op cit 67.
43. Taitz op cit 66.
44. sALe (1995) op cit 8.
17
female transsexuals being three to four times greater in number than female-
to-male transsexuals.45 Extrapolating from this ratio, in 1995, the SALC
reported that the number of transsexuals in South Africa was approximately
in the region of 800, with there being 600 male-to-female and 200 female-to-
male transsexuals.46 The Report further stated that only a number of
transsexuals approach the medical profession for relief, and not all of these
are suitable subjects for reassignment surgery.47 Physical and psychological
factors, together with age contribute to exclusion from surgery48.
Mason and McCall Smith state that some foreign national centres have a
very high turnover of gender reassignment procedures - in the region ofup
to 800 per year, and over 2,000 total cases, including some 400 females,
have been operated upon within the British National Health Service.49
45. Sir M.Roth "Transsexualism and the Sex-change Operation: A Contemporary Medico-Legal and Social
Problem" (1981) 49 Medico-Legal Journal 5.
46. SALC (1995) op cit 8.
47. SALC (1995) op cit 8
48. ibid - beyond a certain age surgery is not appropriate.
49. Mason and McCall Smith op cit 38.
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In July 2000, the Mail and Guardian reported that there were 50 "sex-
change" operations per year between 1971 and 1989 performed secretly by
the South African Defense Force (hereafter SADF).5o Accordingly, some
950 procedures would have been performed in that time period by the
SADF.
It is submitted that in view of these recent revelations, the figures quoted by
the SALe for the general population could possibly be an underestimation,
and the number of transsexuals in the general population, more specifically
those who have had reassignment procedures, could be considerably higher
than the quoted figures.
1.4.2: TRANSVESTITES
A transvestite is an individual who dresses in the clothing of the opposite sex
(cross-dressing)51 and includes inter alia:
(a) Individuals with symptomatic transvestitism. These are costume
50. P.Kirk "Mutilation by the Military" Mail & Guardian July 28 to August 3 2000 pages 4-5.
51. Inter alia: H. Benjamin "Transvestitism and Transsexualism" (1953) 7 International Journal of
Sexology 12; W.A.W. WaIters "Transsexualism - Medical and Legal Aspects" (1983) 16(2) Australian
Journal ofForensic Science 65 at 67.
19
fetishists who wear garments of the opposite sex, usually of an
intimate nature for sexual arousal or as sex objects.
(b) Drag artists - female impersonation entertainers.
(c) Prostitutes, sado-masochists and others who wear clothing of the
opposite sex for deviant purposes.
(d) Criminals dressed in clothing of the opposite sex in order to effect
criminal acts.
A frequently seen symptom of the gender dysphoria syndrome, is a
preference for clothing worn by the opposite sex.52 The transsexual, in cross-
dressing, seeks to identify with the sex that he/she believes he/she belongs
to. In this sense, the transsexual may be a transvestite but not all transvestites
are transsexuals. 53 Transsexuals do not show a preference to cross-dress, as
their dress is correct for their gender. 54
52. SALC (1995) op cit 10.
53. Taitz op cit 66.
54. R.E.Hemphill "Costume and Sex" The Black Bag (1960) 7.
20
1.4.3: HOMOSEXUALS
Homosexuals are individuals who are sexually attracted to persons who they
know are of the same biological sex as themselves. 55 They derive pleasure
from their sexual organs and have no desire to do away with them; they are
satisfied with their biological sex.56 A transsexual cannot be a homosexual
although he is attracted to members ofhis own sex, because by the very
nature of the gender dysphoria syndrome, he genuinely regards such persons
as being of the opposite sex to himself 57 i.e. a transsexual is attracted by
persons whose sex is opposite to that which he/she believes is his/her own.
Morris states58
". " the homosexual, by definition, prefers to make love with others of his own sort, and
would only alienate himself and others by changing. Transsexualism is something
different in kind. It is not a sexual mode or preference. It is not an act of sex at all. It is a
passionate, lifelong, ineradicable conviction, and no true transsexual has ever been
disabused of it. .. ."
55. E.Slater, M.Roth Clinical Psychiatry 3ed (1977) 169.
56. Slater, Roth op cit 13-14.
57. SALC op cit 10.
58. Morris op cit 13-14.
21
1.4.4: INTERSEX STATES
The standard classification of individuals with intersexuality
(hermaphroditism) proceeds according to gonadal morphology.59 In this
terminology, a true hermaphrodite possess both ovarian and testicular
tissue.60 A male pseudohermaphrodite has testes, but external and
sometimes internal genitalia take on female phenotypic aspects.61 A female
pseudohermaphrodite has ovaries, but genital development displays
masculine characteristics.62
As already indicated, transsexuals have the unequivocal biological bodies
and functions of normal members of their biological sexes. Transsexuals are
not hermaphrodites, nor are hermaphrodites transsexuals. 63




63. SALe (1995) op cit 11.
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Problems associated with intersex states may be aggravated if, at birth,
intersexuals are erroneously designated to the sex opposite to that of their
psychological sex, and are raised as members of the incorrect psychological
sex.64 Consequently, sex alignment surgery may be required here in order to
correct the anomalous situations in which they fmd themselves.65
Depending on the actual type of intersexualism, and sex description given in
the person's birth register, the legal consequences of sex alignment surgery
may be synonymous with the legal consequences of the gender reassignment
procedures undertaken by transsexuals.
64. sALe (1995) op cit 11.
65. ibid.
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1.4.5: TOTAL PENILE DESTRUCTION IN THE
MALE CHILD EARLY IN INFANCY
A little boy may lose his sexual organs by accident or through disease, and is
then intentionally raised as a girl. Hormonal treatment, together with gender
reassignment surgery if necessary, is commenced at puberty and is
completed by the time the patient reaches twenty years of age.66
The gender of assignment depends on only one judgement: can the
remaining phallus ultimately develop into a penis adequate for intercourse?67
The success of a penis is dependant upon erectile tissue, and the genitalia
should not only be serviceable but also erotically sensitive.68
Technically, the construction of female genitalia is easier, and therefore the
physician must be convinced that a functional penis is possible.69
66.1. Money, A.A.Ehrhardt Man and Woman: Boy and Girl (1980) 18 118-123, 162.
67. Speroff, Glass and Kase op cit 354.
68. ibid.
69. A.G.Coran, T.Z.Porley "Surgical Management of Ambiguous Genitalia in the Infant and Child."(1991)
26 Journal ofPediatric Surgery 812. Also see P.K.Donahue, D.M.Powell, M.K.Lee "Clinical
Management of Intersex Abnormalities" (1992) 28 Current Problems in Surgery 515.
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All decisions regarding the gender of rearing and the overall treatment
program should be made early in life and if a case has been neglected,
gender reassignments must be made according to the gender identity in
which the child has developed.70 Reassignment of gender can probably be
made safely up to18 months of age.7l
Socialization and hormone therapy are important for gender identity and
sexual function. Future gender role and identity can be in accord with the
assigned gender if the following conditions are met:72
1. The parents are comfortable in their ability to raise their child. The
parents must have participated in this acceptance and adaptation,
and they must have agreed to the gender reassignment decision.
2. Genital reconstruction should take place as early as possible,
certainly well before 18 months. Thereafter gender reassignment is
difficult and adjustment is impaired.




3. Properly timed hormonal and/or additional surgical interventions
must be provided at puberty.
Although penile destruction is unusual, as witnessed by the paucity of
scientific literature pertaining to it, such cases have been reported by the
South African media.73 In 1992, the Beeld reported the case of an 18 month
old Black boy who had been mutilated in this manner, presumably for muti.
Both his thumbs and genitalia had been cut off. He underwent preliminary
surgery at the then Baragwanath Hospital74, and was to be brought up to be a
girl.
The legal consequences of gender reassignment surgery in the little male
child would be substantially the same as in the case of the transsexual,
73. Beeld Tuesday 21 July 1992. Also People 6 October 2000 vol 14 no 20 carries the story ofa boy who
32 years ago, at the age of 8 months suffered iatrogenic trauma to the penis which was burnt off during
circumcision in the United States of America. Dr. J Money of the John Hopkins University in
Baltimore, Maryland, thereafter commenced gender reassignment surgery on him at the age of 22
months. He was then put onto long-term hormonal therapy and it was planned that he would have
a surgically constructed vagina at puberty.
74. Now known as the Coos Hani Hospital.
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should he have initially been registered as a male in the birth register.75
1.5: GENDER REASSIGNMENT PROCECURES
The unfortunate blend of the vital components for a balanced personality,
results in a deeply confused and unhappy person whose maladjustment gives
rise to serious psychological problems.76 The difference between physical
reality of the body, and gender of the mind in these patients often leads to a
lack of psychological wholeness and failure to socially integrate.77
Psychiatric treatment of the fully-fledged syndrome is seldom effective78 and
is usually unable to overcome the conflict raging inside the transsexual. In
many cases, surgery, which converts, and thereby unites the individual's
outward sexual appearance to his/her psychological sex, is the only
treatment that will enable him/her to fmd happiness and the semblance of a
75. SALC (1995) op cit 12.
76. S.A.Strauss Legal Handbook for Nurses and Health Personal (1981) C 1 17.
77. J.1. Hage "Medical Requirements and Consequences of Sex Reassignment Surgery" (1995) 35 Med.
Sci. Law 1 17.
78. Mason and McCall Smith op cit 37.
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normal life.79 Although surgical and hormonal treatment, i.e. the gender
reassignment procedure does not result in a true sexual metamorphosis, with
proper deportment and voice training, it is almost impossible to detect a
post-operative transsexual as having been a member of his/her former sex.80
The gender reassignment procedure, not only gives the patient a realistic
outward appearance of the opposite sex, but it also includes the creation of
the apparent sexual organs of the opposite sex.81 Although neither post-
operative males nor females are capable of procreation, they are able to have
sexual intercourse with members of their former sex.82
79. Morris op cit 115.
80. SALC op cit 4. Also see Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) where April Ashley was described as a
"pin-up beauty" and paraphrasing Professor Dewhurst "the pastiche offemininity can be very
convincing". In Cossey v United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR, [1991] 2 FLR 492 Caroline Cossey
was described as a "Bond girl".
81. H.W.Jones "Operative Treatment of the Male Transsexual" and lE.Hoopes "Operative Treatment of
the Female Transsexual" in R.Green and I.Money (eds) Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (1969)
at 313 and 353 respectively.
82. lTaitz "The Law Relating to The Consummation ofMarriage Where One of the Spouses is a Post
-operative Transsexual" (1986) 15 Anglo American Law Review 141.
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Not all transsexuals are suitable subjects for gender reassignment surgery.
This is because their physical and psychological make-up may preclude
them as appropriate candidates for such, and beyond a certain age surgery is
not advisable. 83
For the surgeon, the key issue prior to considering surgical reassignment is
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the gender dysphoria or the
transsexual feeling is genuine.84 That the patient is mentally and physically
fit for surgery has to be assessed pre-operatively as well. 85
1.5.1: PREREQUISITES FOR SURGERY
Although diagnosing gender dysphoria and determining whether this
warrants gender reassignment surgery, is primarily the task of the
behavioural scientist, the surgeon remains responsible for any diagnosis on
the basis ofwhich he/she performs surgical interventions. 86 The surgeon
83. sALe (1995) op cit 8.




should therefore participate in diagnosing the gender dysphoria of any case
he/she wishes to treat.
It is advised that the behavioural scientist (psychologist or psychiatrist),
must have had supervised training in this particular field of sex therapy and
counseling and must be a member of a reputable gender team, preferably the
same team as the surgeon.87 He/she should know the patient via a diagnostic
or therapeutic relationship for at least six months and should establish that
the patient has had uninterrupted and unchangeable feelings of being in the
wrong body for a period of over two years and has had a successful cross-
living test over a one-year period; i.e. has undergone a reliable real-life
test. 88
87. J.Money, R. Ambinder "Two-year, Real-life Diagnostic Test: Rehabilitation versus Cure" in J.P.Brady,
H.K.H. Brody (eds) Controversy in Psychiatry (1978) 833-845.
88. Hage op cit 18, where it is stated that these pre-operative requirements are in compliance with the Harry
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care. The Standards of Care
contain criteria prerequisites for the diagnosis ofgender dysphoria as accepted by the legal profession,
third party insurance payers and the medical profession, as well as in the malpractice arena in the
United States.
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To determine whether the patient is physically fit for surgery, the surgeon
may lean on the expertise of the endocrinologist with substantial personal
experience in the field ofhonnonal treatment for the transsexual. 89
Only when these diagnostic pre-requisites are met, should the rearrangement
of the body towards its new sexual appearance be perfonned.
1.5.2: GENDER REASSIGNMENT SURGERY
A distinction should be made between non-genital and genital gender
reassignment surgery.
Transsexuals seek to adapt their bodies as optimally as possible to their
gender. 90 Treatment here would include facial surgery, body contouring and
voice adapting in the male to female transsexual, and body contouring in the
female to male transsexual. 91
89. Rage op cit 17.
90. Hage op cit 22.
91. Rage op cit 19.
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Gender reassignment for male to female transsexuals may be completed in
one operation, leading to acceptable cosmetic and functional results
provided the surgery and post-operative treatment are performed with a high
degree of expertise.92 Here, conversion involves the removal of the penis,
testes and scrotum and the creation, by plastic surgery of an artificial vagina
in the region of the identical place of the natural vagina by constructing a
cavity between the prostate gland and the rectum. 93 Hormones are utilized
for the formation of female-like breasts, which may also be constructed by
plastic procedures.94 Post-operative treatment with the female hormone
oestrogen, will result in the reduction ofbody hair and in encouraging the
growth ofbreasts and the rounding ofhips. 95 A properly constructed
artificial vagina can fully accept an erect male penis, and the post-operative
female may have sexual intercourse in the same manner as a biological
female. 96
92. Rage op cit 17.
93. S.S.Rathnam, S.M.Lirn "Surgical Treatment of Transsexualism" in lStudd (ed) Progress in Obstsetrics
and Qynecology (1982) 2 22.
94. N.T.Edgerton "Transsexualism - A Surgical Problem" (1978) 54 Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
448.
95. R.Benjamin, C.Ihlenfeld "Transsexualism" (1973) 3 American Journal ofNursing 453.
96. SALC (1995) op cit 5.
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Gender reassignment surgery in female to male transsexuals can seldom be
achieved in one stage.97 A mastectomy is necessary since testosterone
treatment results only in a moderate reduction in breast size.98 A
hysterectomy, removal of the ovaries and the construction of a penis and
scrotum by plastic procedures are surgically accomplished. 99 Testicular and
penile prostheses are implanted. 100 Post-operative and biological males, who,
as a result of injury or other reasons are unable to achieve an erection and
have sexual intercourse, are able to do so with the help of medical
appliances. IOl
In the day-to-day practice of plastic surgery, the indications for surgery are
self-evident. However, this does not apply to the gross changes brought on
by gender reassignment surgery, which is usually not reversible. 102
97. Rage op cit 17.
98. J. Raymond The Transsexual Empire (1979) 36.
99. Ratnam and Lim op cit 22.
100. J.J.Hage and M.S.Fayman "Masculinizing Surgery for Male Intersexes and Female to Male
Transsexuals" (1994) 5 (3) Medical Sex JournalS.
101. SALe (1995) op cit 5.
102. Hage op cit 17.
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Therefore, this kind of surgery has met with resistance both within and
outside the medical profession, including legal and ethical circles and
whether surgery answers the needs of the transsexual has been questioned. 103
At the one end of the spectrum of opinion is the view that these procedures
provide the only effective relief for transsexualism, while at the other end is
the belief that psychotherapy is as equally effective. 104 It is argued that
psychotherapy is not irreversible, nor as drastic as surgery, nor are the
dangers that are inherent in surgical and hormonal treatment present in
psychotherapy. 105
103. Hage op cit 23.
104. J.Taitz " A Transsexual's Nightmare: The Determination Of Sexual Identity In English Law" (1988)
2 International Journal OfLaw And The Family 139. Also People op cit 33 carried the story of a
victim of penile amputation who was managed with gender reassignment. He subsequently had
reversal of surgery some years later. Independent Online on 19-6-2000, reports ofa 25 year old
Iranian man who underwent a "sex" change to become a woman a year ago. He now requests a
reversal procedure.
105. Taitz op cit 143.
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It is interesting to note that in August 1979, doctors at the John Hopkins
Hospital in Baltimore, USA, announced that they were abandoning gender
reassignment surgery for all but hennaphrodites. This was because a study
had found no difference in the long-tenn adjustment between transsexuals
that were treated surgically or with psychotherapy alone. 106
Mason and McCall Smith state that although psychiatric treatment is
generally ineffective, in practice, a comparatively small number of
applicants are, in fact, recommended for surgery. 107 This is because of the
ethical problem of case selection. Stringent diagnostic prerequisites have to
be satisfied unequivocally before gender reassignment procedures are
perfonned.
106. Strauss op cit 238 at footnote 33, in quoting Time magazine, 27 August 1979.
107. Mason and McCall Smith op cit 38.
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1.6: GENDER REASSIGNMENT PROCEDURES:
CONCLUSION
The nature of gender reassignment procedures has been examined and the
following points need to be noted:
1. The phenomenon of true sex change or sexual metamorphosis does
not exist. Treatment here should correctly be called a gender
reassignment procedure.
2. After undergoing a gender reassignment procedure, the transsexual
takes on the realistic form and appearance ofhis/her post
-operative sex.
3. Although post-operative transsexuals are capable ofhaving
sexual intercourse with members of their now opposite sex,
they are incapable of procreation.
4. Gender reassignment procedures are usually irreversible and carry
a high risk factor to the patient's life and health.
5. Gender reassignment procedures are indicated in transsexuals,
intersexuals and little boys who have suffered penile destruction at
an early age.
6. The legal consequences of gender reassignment for intersexuals and
little boys with penile amputations, are often identical to the legal
36
consequences resulting from a "change of sex" for transsexuals.
As already discussed108 there is no unanimity of medical opinion as to the
therapeutic value of these procedures, neither is there legislation directly
appertaining to this subject. Consequently an exploration of the medico-Iegal
and legal aspects of gender reassignment procedures is essential in order to
determine whether this treatment is "legal" or "illegal".
108. See above.
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CHAPTER 2: MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF
GENDER REASSIGNMENT PROCEDURES
The medical solution, when faced with a conflict of evidence, is to assign a
person to the sex that he/she is most likely to be able to support in society.
The function of the chromosomal sex is then relegated to that of an indicator
of the direction in which to steer an infant's upbringing. 109 Later in life, the
one characteristic of sex or gender that is not apparent to anyone, including
the principal, is the state of a person's chromosomes. HO
An examination of the medico-Iegal aspects of gender reassignment surgery
necessitates an appraisal of the legality of the surgery, consent and the
medical skills required for the entire treatment package. Surgery of this
nature is only justified if the therapeutic objective aimed at in the light of
present day knowledge of the gender dysphoria syndrome is satisfied. As
already discussedIII it is claimed that surgery is undertaken to restore the
patient's psychological equilibrium and to facilitate socialization and social




reacceptance. It is submitted that on this basis, gender reassignment surgery
would be justifiable.
2.1: LEGALITY OF THE SURGERY
The legality of gender reassignment surgery can be described as languishing
in limbo - it has neither been prohibited nor has the surgery received any
official sanction in South Africa. 112 Consequently, as this type of surgery is
not considered as contra bonos mores, it cannot be regarded as a violation of
the criminal law. In the absence of any specific authority, therefore, one can
only apply the general principles of the law.
General principles governing the validity of gender reassignment surgery
require to be examined for an assessment of its current legal status. 113 The
facts are that surgery of this nature is radical, dangerous and generally
irreversible. What needs to be satisfied is the justification of the contention
that this type of surgery is indeed therapeutic. The rationale used for this
justification is that a genuine transsexual is seriously disturbed
112. S.A.Strauss Doctor. Patient and the Law 3ed (1991) 228,229, 235.
113. M.L.Lupton in I Schafer (ed) Family Law Service (1995) J 4.
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psychologically and that psychotherapy has little curative value for the
patient's abnormal relationships and suicidal tendencies. 114 In many
instances the only remedy for the turmoil raging in the patient is to convert
hislher external sexual appearance, which he/she rejects so as to align this
with hislher psychological sexual orientation, fmally to achieve the
equilibrium he/she so desperately seeks. 115
Although Strauss has reported conflicting views of South African doctors,
the general overall expert opinion on the question of gender reassignment is
114. M.L.Lupton in I Schafer (ed) Family Law Service (1995) J 4.
115. N.T.Edgerton "Transsexualism - A Surgical Problem" (1978) 54 Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
448.
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that the therapeutic objective it strives to achieve is sufficient justification
for this surgery despite the doubts still voiced about its efficacy. 116
116. Strauss op cit 238 , reports on his discussion with Pretoria gynaecologist, Dr. Meredith Botes which
concerned the 1979 decision by the John Hopkin's Hospital to abandon surgery on the basis that it
only served as a palliative measure (see above). Dr. Botes who had treated many transsexuals
and had developed a special interest in the syndrome could not agree with the outlook of the John
Hopkin's decision as he regarded his success rate as high. However, in 1981, Professor Max Feldman
of Johannesburg expressed scepticm about gender reassignment surgery and was of the view that in
the case ofgender change in person's not of intersex, the abandonment of surgery was to be
welcomed. Also, reported by Strauss was the opinion of the French team that equated this type of
surgery to fraud.
Hage and Fayman op cit 7 reported in 1994 that over the previous 20 years the gender team of the
Free University Hospital (Amsterdam) had registered over 1,200 transsexuals ofwhom approximately
50% were referred for surgery. The Johannesburg Medical Forum for Treatment ofTranssexuals had
started working in close co-operation with the Amsterdam team. The basic principle of these teams
was that the pre-operative requirements had to be met in each individual case.
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Current public policy with regard to cosmetic operations while risking
danger to the patient's life and health, requires to be evaluated and the
opinion on gender change operations designed to overcome severe
psychoneurotic problems cannot be considered as contra bonos mores. 117 In
principle, any drastic operation of a non-therapeutic nature is unlawful,
unless a legally justifiable purpose is sought to be attained by it (e.g. a
cosmetic improvement which will not substantially endanger the life or
health of the patient, or the removal of tissue or an organ from a healthy
person for the purposes of transplantation). 118 Justification for this type of
surgery lies in the fact that its true nature is therapeutic and in the best
interests of the patient.
As South Africa has not legislated to prohibit this type of surgery, doctors
are free to perform it according to the dictates of their consciences, and in
line with accepted medical practice. 119
117. D.J.McQuoid-Mason and S.A.Strauss (revised by D.J.McQuoid-Mason) "Medicine, Dentistry,
Pharmacy and other Health Professions" W.AJoubert ed (1999) vol 17 The Law of South Africa at
220.
118. Strauss op cit 228.
119. Lupton op cit J4.
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It is to be noted that the repealed 1974 amendments to the Births, Marriages
and Deaths Registration Act120 in making provision for the formal alteration
of a person's officially registered sex must have envisaged gender
reassignment procedures being performed through surgical means and was
tantamount to endorsing it. This provision was subsequently repealed as it
was not interpreted by the courts as assisting in solving the legal dilemmas
of the transsexual. 121
An operation performed on an individual who is biologically of the intersex
state to enable the person to be compatible with one sex or the other, is
lawful, provided the requisite consent is obtained. 122 It is submitted that the
same policy should apply to the little boy child who, at an early age, is the
victim of penile amputation as a result of whatever cause.
120. Act 51 of 1974, which inserted section 7B into the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81
of 1963.
121. McQuoid-Mason and Strauss LAWSA vol17 166 at 220.
122. ibid.
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Notwithstanding the acceptable therapeutic indication for surgery, the skill
with which these procedures are perfonned and the aesthetic results
achieved, it is to be determined whether the consent of the patient per se
affords justification for the procedure. As gender reassignment procedures
are not contra bonos mores, consent per se does afford justification for the
surgery.
2.2: CONSENT
The surgeon intending to perfonn the operation must obtain an infonned
consent from hislher patient. 123 The question in respect of consent by
transsexuals is whether they are so psychologically ill as to be mentally
incompetent to give an infonned consent.
In medical cases, for infonned consent to be valid,124 the patient must:
(a) have knowledge of the nature of the harm or risk involved~
(a) appreciate and understand the nature of the harm or risk;
(b) consent to the harm or assumed risk~
123. S.A.Strauss and M.J.Strydom Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Reg (1967) 211.
124. McQuoid-Mason and Strauss LAWSA vol 17 146 at 196, in citing Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA
408 (C) 425.
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(c) have given a comprehensive consent, i.e. a consent that extends to the entire
transaction, inclusive of its consequences~
(d) be legally capable of giving consent~125 and
(e) have the mental capacity to consent.
It has to be determined whether the above prerequisites can be satisfied in
the transsexual so as to allow for validity of consent. The doctor must be
satisfied that the transsexual's mind has not been so affected as to render
him/her incapable ofunderstanding the nature and consequences of the
proposed gender reassignment and that he/she agrees to the entire procedure,
including its risks and consequences. 126 The determination of the mental
capacity of the transsexual is the task of the behavioral scientist as
previously mentioned127. In view of the stringent pre-operative counseling
125. For instance, in terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 s 39 (4) (a) - everyone over 18 years ofage is
competent to consent without assistance of parent or guardian to the performance of any operation
upon themselves. s 39 (4) (b) allows everyone over 14 years to consent without assistance from their
parent or guardian to any medical treatment for themselves or their children.
126. lP.Holloway "Transsexuals - Some Further Legal Considerations." (1972) 5 CILSA 71.
127. See above
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and treatment of the patient over a protracted period of time, it is submitted
that all the above prerequisites will have been satisfied and the consent given
by the transsexual for the gender reassignment surgery will have been
properly informed and valid.
Consent, however, is valid only if the act consented to is in accordance with
public policy (i.e. not contra bonos mores). 128 For instance, consent to
reckless, mutilating surgery would not render a practitioner's conduct
lawful. In the case of the transsexual, however, as has already been pointed
out129 gender reassignment surgery, done in good faith is regarded as not
being contrary to public policy.
The validity of consent applies to both unmarried and married persons. The
Bill ofRights of the Constitution,130 assures everyone of the right to bodily
128. Strauss and Strydom op cit 182.
129. See above.
130. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 s 12 (2) (b).
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and psychological integrity including the right to security in and control over
their bodies. Accordingly, it is not necessary for one spouse to obtain the
consent of the other spouse when undergoing gender reassignment
procedures.
It is submitted that informed consent for gender reassignment surgery in
transsexuals is valid for all purposes of the law if the above criteria are
satisfied. These include the recognition by the patient that:
(a) he/she will no longer be able to function sexually or procreatively
as a member ofhislher anatomical sex;
(b) the procedure will not change or alter hislher biological sex; and
(c) he/she is requesting and consenting to the procedure to prevent the
deterioration of the hislher mental health.
2.3: MEDICAL SKILLS
Behavioral scientists, plastic surgeons, gynaecologists, urologists, and
endocrinologists are the specialists whose skills will be required at various
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. h f 1 131stages ID t e treatment 0 transsexua s.
The treatment package includes:
(1) an evaluation of the patient's motives for requesting surgery132-
done by a behavioral scientist over a period of counseling for at
least 6 months .133,
(2) an evaluation of the patient's understanding of the problems and
practicalities involved in undergoing gender reassignment134 by
both the surgeons and the behavioral scientists;
(3) the implementation of a pre-operative trial period135 by the team;
and,
(4) for those who undergo the surgery, a period of post-operative
adjustment136 which would include long-term counseling and
hormonal treatment.
131. Morris op cit 102.
132. Lupton in Schafer Family Law Service (1995) J6.
133. Rage op cit 18.
134. Green and Money op cit 132.
135. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld op cit 454.
136. R.Benjamin The Transsexual Phenomenon (1966) 128.
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Management of these patients with the correct medical skills is of medico-
legal significance as a misdiagnosis and inappropriate treatment will lead to
great distress and suffering by the individual and a possible law suit against
the medical team. In addition it has to be pointed out to the patient that
although it is hoped that the desired long-term psychological results will be
brought about, this cannot be guaranteed.
49
2.4: MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS - CONCLUSION
The legal position in South Africa regarding gender reassignment procedures
for gender dysphoria syndrome is as follows:
(1) Gender reassignment procedures are not contra bonos mores.
(2) Gender reassignment operations are nearly everywhere justified as
therapeutic procedures under the doctrine of "necessity" or
"genuine medical treatment."
(3) The legality of consent to gender reassignment depends upon the
requisites for informed consent to be satisfied.
(4) Reassignment surgery cannot be regarded as unlawful where the
legal and medical criteria for the procedures have been met.
(5) Desired long-term psychological results cannot be guaranteed as a
certain sequel of a gender reassignment operation.
Although the performance of gender reassignment surgery upon
transsexuals, subject to certain conditions is lawful, not all juristic problems
connected with transsexualism are solved. The problem here is not whether
the surgery is lawful or not, but with the impact of the operation on the legal
status of the individual after surgery.
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CHAPTER 3: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
GENDER REASSIGNMENT SURGERY -
DOCUMENTARY AMENDMENTS
The legal position of the post-operative transsexual presents a challenge to
lawyers and jurists. Although the medical profession has made the notion of
gender reassignment, and hence gender change a reality, it is the lawyers and
the courts that have been presented with the medical fait accompli. The
courts have been required to place the post-operative individual within the
limitations of the existing law which has, up to 1996, prior to the passing of
the Constitution137 recognized only biological males and females. 138
The rights of transsexuals are governed by the status conferred upon them by
common law, state139 and the Constitution. Basic legal concepts such as
137. Act 108 of 1996 s 9(3).
138. The court which decided W v W 19762 SA 308 (W) had no legislation, local common law or local
earlier cases to turn to for guidance. As a consequence it based its judgement on the case of Corbett v
Corbett supra using the Onnrod biological criteria that places individuals into the distinctly male or
female category depending on the chromasomal, gonadal and genital sex.
139. lTaitz "A Transsexual's Nightmare: The Determination Of Sexual Identity In English Law"
(1988) 2 International Journal OfLaw and the Family 143.
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sanity, solvency, majority, sex, marital status, divorce and insolvency are
included in status. 140 Where the common law does not sufficiently protect
status, the legislature should intervene to ensure that the law is consistent
with the Constitution. It follows that gender reassignment surgery and the
legal consequences that follow, including the determination of sexual
identity, should be matters of great interest to the state.
Our common law was developed on the premise that there are two
immutable sexes. 141 It did not recognize the phenomenon of transsexualism
or lend any support to the notion of gender reassignment. 142 Nevertheless,
for the post-operative transsexual, the next logical step after completion of
surgery, is that ofhaving all his/her documents altered accordingly. 143 A
prerequisite for this is to have his/her previous gender erased and his/her
new gender recorded in the official register144
140. ibid.
141. Lupton in Schafer Family Law Service J7.
142. HR Hahlo The South African Law ofHusband and Wife Sed (1985) 67-68; W v W 1976 (2) SA 308
(W).




Although Parliament had previously made provision to allow for the change
of the sex description of a post-operative transsexual in such person's birth
register, there was no legislation unequivocally recognizing such person's
. f h I 145 Th 1 . I . 146post-operattve sex for all purposes 0 t e aw. e egls attve enactment
concerning the change of sex description of a post-operative transsexual,
provided that:
"The Secretary (for the Interior) may on the recommendation of the Secretary ofHealth
alter, in the birth register of any person who has undergone a change of sex, the
description of the sex of such person and may for the purpose call for such medical
reports and institute such investigation as he may deem necessary. ,,147
145. SALe op cit 14.
146. The Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81 of 1963.
147. Act 81 of 1963 s 7B. When introducing the Bill regarding s 7B the then Deputy Minister of Interior
informed Parliament inter alia: "For the past few years the Department of Interior has, on request
altered a person's sex description in his or her birth register after such person has undergone a change
of sex as a result of medical treatment ... The Government law advisers have confirmed that no
provision exists in the Act in terms ofwhich the sex description of a person who has undergone a
change of sex may be altered in his birth register ... It is consequently being proposed, firstly, that the
Secretary for the Interior be vested with power to alter in a person's birth register the sex description
ofa person who has undergone a change of sex on the recommendation of the Secretary ofHealth .. ,
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Accordingly, the state recognized gender reassignment surgery as lawful
medical treatment and did not consider it to be contra bonos mores. By
inference, it is possible that Parliament intended the transsexual's post-
operative sex, to be recognized for all purposes of the law in South Africa.
Although section 7B had a minimal effect on the general way of life, and full
integration into society ofpost-operative transsexuals, the enactment enabled
the latter to obtain official documents e.g. an identity document, indicating
their post-operative sex, with no reference to their former sex - hence there
was no discrepancy between their apparent sex and their registered sex. 148
Where social and commercial practices required the production of a birth
certificate, the post-operative transsexual was not placed in the humiliating
position ofhaving to explain his/her predicament. 149 Furthermore, by being
and, secondly, that the alteration of sex descriptions ofpersons who have undergone a change of sex,
which have already been effected in the birth registers, shall be deemed to have been effected legally."
From House of Assembly Debates Vol 51 cols 4441-2, 4 October 1974.
148. SALe (1995) op cit 15.
149. ibid.
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able to obtain an identity document indicating his/her post-operative sex, a
transsexual: 150
(a) could not be convicted of contravening the Prohibition of
Disguises Act 151 or of impersonating a member of the opposite
sex in contravention of any ordinance or by-law; and
(b) had little difficulty in obtaining a passport in his/her post-operative
name and sex. 152
However, in the case ofW v W153 the leading case in South Africa,
concerning the determination of the sexual identity of a post-operative
female in a divorce casel54, the courts did not interpret the provision made
by section 7B in the former Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act155
as assisting in solving the dilemma of the transsexual. 156
150. SALC op cit 15.
151. Act No. 16 of 1969.
152. SALC (1995) op cit 15 at footnote 41 - The change of the first name could be accomplished by a
simple application to the Registrar ofBirths Marriages and Deaths.
153. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W) at 314 F et seq.
154. See below.
155. Act 81 of 1963.
156. McQuoid-Mason and Strauss LAWSA vol17 op cit 166.
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The effect ofW v W negated the possibility ofpost-operative transsexuals
being recognized in South African law as members of their post-operative
sex. 157 It also served to negate the possibility of section 7B becoming the
cornerstone for the recognition of a transsexual's post-operative sex. 158 The
provision was subsequently repealed by the new Births and Deaths
Registration Act. 159 The justification for this step was stated as follows
during the second Parliamentary session reading in 1992:
" ... I just want to issue a final word of warning to those hon members who have
nevertheless considered undergoing a sex change operation that the good old days when a
man could become a woman after a sex change operation, and a woman a man, no longer
exist as a result of court judgements in that regard.,,160
The new Act, which was implemented on 1 August 1992, made no provision
for the alteration of the description of the sex of any person who had
undergone a change of sex. The provisions of section 7B of the repealed Act
157. Sirnms v Sirnms 1981 (4) SA 186 (D).
158. sALe (1995) op cit 18.
159. Act 51 of 1992.
160. Minister of Interior: Hansard House ofAssembly Debates col 2356 19 March 1992.
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have not been enacted in the new Act. As a consequence it is not possible for
any person who has undergone a gender reassignment procedure to alter
his/her sex description in his/her birth register.
The Births and Deaths Registration Act 161 was, however, amended during
the 1993 Parliamentary session by the addition of the following subsection
to section 33: 162
(c) A person who was in the process of undergoing a change of sex before the
commencement ofthis Act, may on completion of the said process apply in
terms of section 7B of the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act,
1963, for the alteration of his sex description in his birth register.
This subsection came into effect on 1 September 1993 163 and offered some
respite to persons who were already in the process of undergoing gender
reassignment procedures. It does not, however, assist persons who wish to
undergo gender reassignment procedures but were not undergoing the
procedure at the time that the Births and Deaths Registration Act
161. Act 51 of 1992.
162. sALe op cit 19.
163. ibid.
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commenced. The failure to recognise the status of transsexuals who now
undergo gender reassignment procedures may well be unconstitutional.
3.2: THE CONSTITUTION: SECTION 33
Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa164 on just
administrative action states as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable
and procedurally fair.
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,165 was enacted to give effect
inter alia to this right.
As surgery for gender reassignment is not considered contra bonos mores;
and as South Africa has not legislated to prohibit this type of surgery, it is
submitted that South African surgeons will continue to perform this surgery
according to the dictates of their consciences and in line with acceptable
medical practice. However, for the post-operative transsexual, there is no
legal provision for the next logical step, which is to have all his/her
164. Act 108 of 1996.
165. Act No. 3 of2000.
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documents altered accordingly. It is submitted that this is a direct
infringement of the rights afforded to these individuals by section 33 of the
Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000.
As has been previously stated,166 with successful gender reassignment
surgery and proper medical treatment, the post-operative transsexual
possesses the full capacity to function sexually as male or female. It follows
that there should be no legal barrier, social taboo or reason grounded in
public policy to prevent such a person's identity from coinciding with
h · /h d 167IS er new gen er.
166. See above
167. " , She's a Man,' says Home Affairs" Mail & Guardian February 25 to March 2 2000 - reporting on
an apparent mishap by the Department ofHome Affairs 9 years ago when Georgia Kinghom was
registered as a male instead of a female after relocating to South Africa from England. Kinghom's ID
number indicated that her gender is male, (the system encodes particulars ofgender in numerical form
only) and this was picked up by an official at the local licensing office who informed her that she
could not have her vehicle licensed as the computer system indicated that she was a man. The Home
Affairs mistake affected Kinghorn financially. With a new job, she had applied for a cheque account
and a credit card, but the bank could not process her application until her "gender problem" had been
sorted out with the department. From a social point ofview, she was immobilised because she could
not drive her vehicle without the necessary license to be on the road. Although Kinghorn's problem
apparently was a consequence ofa mishap at the Department, this situation raises the various legal
and ethical issues and in a way demonstrates the human rights violations imposed on transsexuals
who have had gender reassignment procedures, but are refused recognition by the law.
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CHAPTER 4: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
GENDER REASSIGNMENT SURGERY -
MARRIAGE AND MATTERS ANCILLARY
THERETO
4.1: MARRIAGE - DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
According to our common law, marriage is the union of a man and a woman,
and two persons of the same sex cannot marry. 168 Closely allied to this
defmition is the fact that marriage is limited to persons of the opposite sex169
which means that same sex marriages are not recognised by the law.
Proscriptions against same sex marriages has ancient roots - Roman law,
Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards, old English law, and the laws
of the various American states. 170
168. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W) at 310D-E, relying on Corbett v Corbett (1970) 2 All ER 33.
169. Jones v Hallahan 501 SW 2d 588 (Court of Appeals at Kentucky 1973) at 589; Baker v Nelson 191
NW 2d 185 (Supreme Court ofMinnesota 1971) at 186.
170. Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1985) at 192,196-197.
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The historical perspective necessitates a consideration of same sex marriages
because transsexuals relationships have been viewed as same sex
relationships by our COurtS. 171 Oliver Wendell Holmes, in response to the
historical argument states:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down
in the time ofHenry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. ,,172
The works ofAmerican historian, John Boswell,173 show clearly how
historical arguments distort history:
"Roman society, at least in its urban centres, did not for the most part distinguish
gay people from others and regarded homosexual interest and practice as an
ordinary part of the range of human eroticism."
171. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
172. O.W.Holmes "The Path ofLaw" (1987) 10 Harvard LR 457 at 469.
173. J.Boswell Christianity. Social Tolerance. and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe From
the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century (1980) 333.
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Intolerance against same sex relationships began in the latter half of the
twelfth century, probably because of an increase of intolerance of minority
groups such as non-Christians especially Jews. This led to an intolerance of
deviation from the standards of the majority, enforceable for the fITst time in
the newly emerging corporate states of the High Middle Ages. 174
Boswell states that same sex unions were widespread in the ancient world,
where heterosexual matrimony was viewed as a dynastic or business
arrangement and love in such relationships, when it did occur, arose
following the coupling. Feelings that the twentieth century would call
romantic now, were invested by ordinary men and women in same sex
relationships then, either as passionate friendships, or more structured and
institutionalized unions. 175 It is interesting to note that until the fourteenth
century in Europe, the Christian church solemnized same sex unions. 176
174. Boswell op cit 334.
175. lBoswell The Marriage ofLikeness: Same-Sex Unions in Pre-Modern Europe (1996) 280.
176. Boswell (1996) op ch appendices.
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Western Europe was not the only area where same-sex unions were allowed
to flourish. Native American, African (including South Africal77) and
Asian178 cultures bore witness to similar relationships.
The importance of this history is to serve as a warning against the tendency
to move from history into myth.179 Conceptions regarding marriage and
attitudes to same-sex relationships vary across time and cultures. This is
highlighted by historical and anthropological research. 180 The research
demonstrates that marriage is constructed by society and society is
dynamic. 181
The traditional legal defmition ofmarriage in heterogeneous South Africa,
as stated by Sinclair: "has become outmoded and unacceptable to a large
proportion of the population. ,,182 The legal tradition of marriage is viewed as
177. W.N.Eskridge A History of Same-Sex Marriage (1993) 79.
178. Eskridge op cit 1435-84.
179. A.Pantazis "An Argument for the Legal Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Marriage" (1997) 114 SALJ
561.
180. R.D.Mohr Gays/Justice: A Study ofEthics Society and Law (1988) 32.
181. Eskridge op cit 1434.
182. lD.Sinc1air The Law of Marriage led (1996) 169.
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an ideal and less of a marriage as is actually experienced. This is because, in
spite of there being no coherent tradition of long-term, monogamous,
procreation-oriented marriage among heterosexuals, same sex couples are
measured against this ideal which is found wanting and they are thereby
denied entry into marriage. 183
The understanding that historical ill treatment is a reason for protecting
rights underpins South Africa's Constitution as a whole. In the case of same-
sex marriages, historical ill treatment is the reason for protecting the rights
of same-sex couples. This is the reason that unfair discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation is prohibited. 184
4.2: THE CASE OF WvW 1976 2 SA 308 (W)
The only reported case in South African law dealing with the marital status
of a post-operative transsexual is that ofW v W. 185 The essential issue
before the court here, was the determination of the sexual identity of a
183. S.K.Homer "Against Marriage" (1994) 29 Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties LR 505 at 521.
184. Pantazis op cit 562 ; Act 108 of 1996 section 9 (3).
185. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W) at 310-D-E, relying on Corbett v Corbett ( 1970) 2 All ER 33.
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post-operative transsexual female in a divorce case. The plaintiff, who had
been born and registered as a male, had been diagnosed as a transsexual and
had undergone gender reassignment surgery on psychiatric advice. After the
reassignment procedure, the plaintiff changed her fITst names and had her
sex description in her birth register altered. At the time that the parties
married, the defendant was aware of the plaintiffs change of gender.
According to the evidence, the marriage was consummated and the parties
enjoyed normal sexual relations. 186 The plaintiff sought a divorce on the
basis of her husband's adultery. Accepting the basic premise of our law, that
a valid marriage could only be contracted between two persons of the
opposite sex, the court ruled that the vital question to be decided concerned
the true sex of the plaintiffprior to marriage. 187 No medical evidence was led
to support the plaintiffs claim that the corrective surgery "she" had
undergone had changed her sex from male to female.
The court thus accepted the medical evidence led in the earlier English case
186. WvW at 310 A.
187. WvW at 310 H.
6S
of Corbett v Corbett188 and applied the Ormrod test which requires that a
person's sex is determined by a congruence of purely biological factors
(chromosomes, gonads and genitalia). 189 The Ormrod test indicated that at
birth she was a biological male and that the sex surgery did not make her a
biological female. As a marriage is a union between people of the opposite
biological sexes, the plaintiffs purported marriage was held to be a nullity.
The surgically created vagina was referred to as an artificial one and hence it
was declared that on this basis, the marriage could never have been
consumated. 190
188. Corbett v Corbett (1970) 2 All ER 33.
189. See above.
190. M.L.Lupton "The Validity ofPost-operative Transsexual Marriages" (1976) 87 SALJ 389-
390. The court decision is strongly criticized by Lupton who states: "If the plaintiff is not a woman,
what is she? It is inhuman and impracticable to consider her merely as a castrated male." He argues
that there was an over- technical interpretation ofthe law leading to disadvantages, inhumanity
and inequity and this far outweighs the scant benefit ofupholding a principle which is infringed only if
viewed from the vantage-point of society in general. He criticizes the court for accepting the situation
that the man professed to love her, enjoyed her sexual comfort, companionship and loyalty, accepted a
financial contribution from her from her joint income, and when he decided to have sexual intercourse
with another person, had the marriage annulled and escaped a maintenance order being made against
him. By having sanctioned the defendant's behaviour so as to uphold a medical technicality the law
was guilty of perpetrating a greater injustice. The law must have foreseen the possibility ofa post
-surgical transsexual contracting a marriage when the legislature allowed a person to re-register his/her
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The effect of the decision in W v W is that it effectively prevents the post-
operative transsexual from marrying at all. Practical and psychological
reasons prevented him from marrying in his original gender role while the
court legally invalidated his marriage (and all) others in his new gender
role. 191
A humanistic, rather than a legalistic approach to marriage between two
biological males, one of whom had undergone a female gender reassignment
procedure, was taken by the New Jersey court in MT V JT. 192 The court's
decision to uphold the marriage, differed diametrically from the approach in
Corbett v Corbett193 and W v W. 194 The court was of the opinion that the
reassignment surgery had harmonized the wife's gender and genitalia in
such a way that she became fully capable of sexual activity as a woman.
This resulted in the transsexual becoming a member of the female
sex (section 7B of Act 81 of 1963).
191. J.Taitz "The Legal Consequences ofa Sex Change - A Judicial Dilemma" (1980) 97 SALJ 65.
192. MT v IT 355 (A) (2d) 204 (1976).
193. Corbett v Corbett (1970) 2 All ER 33.
194. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W)
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sex for marital purposes. Her subsequent marriage to a male was therefore
aI 'd 195VI.
The principle applied by the New Jersey court was not applied by the
English courts after the Corbett case. In 1983, the Court of Appeal in R v
Tan and Others196 reaffrrmed the Corbett decision, when it extended the
legal determination of sexual identity to criminal law. The case involved a
criminal charge against a Ms G for living on the earnings of prostitution.
This was an offence that could only be committed by a male. In her defense,
G alleged that she was a post-operative female. The Court applied the
Ormrod test holding that surgery cannot change a person's sex, which is
determined by chromosomal structure. G thus remained a male despite her
reconstructed genitalia.
There can be little doubt that a party to a marriage may successfully seek a
divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage because the
spouses would no longer be able to have normal sexual relationships should
195. Lupton op cit in Schafer Family Law Service J8.
196. R v Tan [1983] 2 All ER 12 (CA)~ J Taitz "The Legal Determination of the Sexual Identity ofa Post
-operative Transsexual seen as a Human Rights Issue" (1989) 7 Med Law 467,470.
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the other spouse undergo gender reassignment procedures during the
subsistence of the marriage. 197 A spouse undergoing gender reassignment
procedures must be seen as bringing the existing marriage to an end.
4.3: THE LEGALITY OF TRANSSEXUAL
MARRIAGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH
AFRICA
As yet, our courts have not had an opportunity to pronounce on the
constitutionality of the common law prohibition of same-sex marriages. This
prohibition is not in keeping with the democratic values of the post-apartheid
South Africa. Although the basic norm of legal authority has changed from
parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy, non-violation of the
basic rights of the transsexual will be viewed both in light of the
Constitution198 and The Promotion ofEquality and Prevention ofUnfair
Discrimination Act. 199
197. Steinke v Steinke 238 Pa Super 74 357 A LR (2d) 674 (1975).
198. Act 108 of 1996.
199. Act 4 of2000.
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4.3.1: TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES AND THE
CONSTITUTION
The South African Constitution is widely recognized as one of the most
progressive and liberal constitutions in the world.200 The Constitution
commences as follows: 201
"The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state
founded on the following values:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement
of human rights and freedoms."
Section 7 of the Constitution provides:
"7 (1) This Bill ofRights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic
values ofhuman dignity, equality and freedom.
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights."
200. J.A.Singh "Freedom ofExpression: The Constitutionality ofa Ban on Human Cloning in the Context
ofa Scientist's Guaranteed Right to Freedom of Scientific Research." (1999) 62 THRHR 579.
201. Section 1.
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Although there is no hierarchy ofbasic rights, from a human rights
perspective, probably the most fundamental of the entrenched rights are the
rights to equality, respect, dignity, privacy and freedom as they are
interwoven into the fabric of every person's life and existence.202 It follows
therefore, that the government should refrain from interfering in the personal
and intimate affairs of an individual's life, except where such interference
would be necessary to safeguard the rights of others and the interest of the
community as a whole.203 As sexual relationships touch an extremely
sensitive aspect of the right to privaci04 the state would only be entitled to
interfere with a person's private sexual activity if it can establish that such
interference is reasonably justified in terms of the limitation clause.205 The
South African legal system, however, continually interferes with and denies,
what it considers minority sexual inclinations, namely, sexual preferences of
transsexuals, gays and transvestites.206
202. D.Singh "The Refusal to Recognise Same-Sex Marriages - A Pandora's Box of Inequalities."(1999)
32 (1) De Jure 29.
203. Such interference would be an invasion of privacy - see s 14 of the Constitution.
204. Act 108 of 1996 s 14.
205. Act 108 of 1996 s 36.
206. D.Singh op cit 29.
71
Until as recently as 1998, sodomy, (consensual and private acts included)
remained a crime in South Africa, despite the Constitution repudiating
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.207
The argument for the recognition of a post-surgical transsexual's marriage to
a member of his/her previous sex can be located in the Constitution in the
rights to equality and privacy.208
Section 9 of the Constitution grants to every person the right to equal benefit
of the law without unfair discrimination on various grounds, including inter
alia, belief and sexual orientation.209
207. S v H 1995 1 SA 120 (C) - the accused who had engaged in a voluntary sexual relationship with
another man, was convicted of the offense of sodomy. On review before Ackermann J, the court
recognized the changing public attitudes to homosexual relationships and keeping the conviction set
aside the sentence and replaced it with one of a caution and a discharge. S v Kampher 1997 4 SA 460
(C) - also involving an act of sodomy questioned the constitutionality of such a crime. National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice 1998 (2) SACR 102 (y{) (1998 (6)
BCLR 726): declaration of invalidity of sodomy as a crime confirmed 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
208. Section 9 and 14 respectively.
209. Section 9 (3).
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Sexual orientation is described as the "individual's choice ofmale or female
sexual partner,,210 i.e. the way in which an individual prefers to practice
his/her sexuality. In the Kampher case, Judges Farlam and Ngcobo held that
section 9(3) of the Constitution, with its specific reference to sexual
orientation as a proscribed ground of unfair discrimination, clearly evinced
an intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to expand the
grounds of tolerance and understanding so that sexual activity between
consenting adults of minority sexual inclinations is no longer subject to
criminal sanction.211
In the case of the National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v
Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) Ackermann stated that the concept of
sexual orientation as used in s 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution had to be given
a generous interpretation of which it was linguistically and textually fully
210. Pantazis op cit 568.
211. S v Kampher 19974 SA 460 (C); also Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513, (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 609-
the Canadian Supreme Court has read sexual orientation as a prohibited ground ofdiscrimination into
the guarantee of equality in the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms (sections 1 and 15(1)) on
the basis, in part, ofgays' and lesbians' membership ofa historically disadvantaged group.
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capable of bearing. This applied equally to the orientation of persons who
were bi-sexual,or transsexual.212
Sachs stated that s 9 was unambiguous in that discrimination on the grounds
ofbeing a member of a group with minority sexual inclinations was
presumptively unfair and a violation of fundamental rights. Homosexual
erotic activity had to be treated on an equal basis with that ofheterosexual
erotic activity i.e. the same-sex quality of the conduct should not be a
consideration in determining where and how the law should intervene.213
The right to equality is a universally accepted right and is recognised by
most bills of rights around the world.214 Article 7 of the Universal
Declaration ofHuman Rights provides that:
"All men are equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to equal
protection before the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination."
212. National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 21.
213. National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 133.
214. Govender K. "The Impact of the Equality Provisions ofthe Constitution" 1997 182 Obiter 258.
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Cameron maintains that sexual orientation is - or should be a matter of
indifference morally and constitutionally and consequently any
discrimination on the grounds of minority sexual inclinations would be
indefensible.215 McQuoid-Mason explains that as the Constitution prohibits
unfair discrimination on the grounds of inter alia "sexual orientation", it
could be argued that this could cover marriages between transsexuals and
members of their biological sex. 216
It is submitted that should groups with minority sexual inclinations be
denied the opportunity to enter into a legal marriage on the basis of their
sexual orientation, the equality clause of the Constitution would be violated.
This is because the state imposes a burden on or denies a benefit to them as a
result of their sexual orientation. Accordingly, members of a constitutionally
protected class are discriminated against without sufficient justification for
215. E.Cameron "Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights" (1993) 110
SALJ 40.
216. McQuoid-Mason and Strauss op cit LAWSA voll? 166.
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th d
· . . . 217e Iscnmmatlon.
The prohibition ofmarriage between people with minority sexual
inclinations is also inconsistent with section 14 of the Constitution, which
protects the right to privacy.
McQuoid-Mason states that the right to privacy is essential for the
preservation of an individual's human dignity including his physical
psychological and spiritual well being?18
According to Devenish privacy is a basic human need which is essential for
the development and maintenance of both a free society and a mature and
stable personality for the human being.219 He states that it is profoundly
217. S v Kampher where Farlam J stated: "It is difficult to see how any discrimination which has already
been stigmatised as "unfair" (which is what I consider the present discrimination to be) can ever be
regarded as permissible to the extent that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality." See also National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v
Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA6 (CC).
218. D.J.McQuoid-Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1978) 1.
219. G.E.Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill ofRights (1999) 135.
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cherished as a right by persons, both in relation to intrusion by the state and
as far as other people in the community are concerned and it is a right which
is inextricably intertwined with human dignity.220 Therefore the right to
privacy is based on human dignity and has as its objective the preservation
for each individual of the "choice ofwhen and how much he or she will
allow others to know about his or her mind, or body or private activities.221
The concepts of privacy and constitutionalism are closely related and result
in the notion ofpersonal autonomy which allows individuals the right to
choose how, within the parameters of the law, to live their lives and to make
crucial decisions about the conduct of their lives without interference from
the state.222 The right to privacy is important because autonomy nurtures
personhood and individuality.223 The right to marry should be regarded as
falling under the right to privacy as has been the case in the United States of
America.224
220. Devenish op cit 135.
221. ibid.
222. Devenish op cit 136.
223. Bemstein and others v Bester and others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC), 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at
para 65.
224. Zablocki v Redhail434 US 374 (1978) at 384-385.
77
The attributes ofmarriage have been described as, inter alia, those of
creating a consortium omnis vitae, i.e. a physical, moral and spiritual
community of life. 225 Lupton describes these components as consisting of
sexual cohabitation, loyalty, fidelity, and mutual assistance and support.226
These attributes which promote the notion of autonomy, personhood and
individuality, are equally applicable to same-sex as to opposite-sex
couples.227
The prohibition against marriage by a post-operative transsexual to a person
of his/her previous sex is not rescued by section 36 of the Constitution,
which provides that rights may only be limited where :
"the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
225. H.R.Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife 4ed (1975) 109.
226. Lupton op cit 387.
227. W.M.Hohengarten "Same-sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy" (1994) 103 Yale LJ 152. An
aspect of the right to privacy that same sex marriage brings out is the importance of choice in matters
of intimate association. The individual has a right to define hislher own identity and not have an
identity imposed by the state on him/her.
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factors ,including-
(a) the nature of the right~
(b) the importance ofthe purpose ofthe limitation~
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation~
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose~ and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
The nature of the rights and the purpose of the limitation are fundamental to
the limitation of rights. 228 Although there is no express right to marry in the
Constitution, natural law recognises that freedom to marry is a basic civil
right. 229 Furthermore, the right of all individuals to marry is affrrmed in the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. 23o The right to marry is the right of
individuals and not of the sexes - the essence of the right to marry is the
freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice.231
228. B.Grant "Comments and Cases on Same-Sex Marriage" (1996) 12 SAJHR 571.
229. Pantazis op cit 124 at 575.
230. Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, Article 16(1).
231. Perez v Lippold 198 P 2d 17 (Supreme Court of CaliforniaI948); lames Trosino "American
Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy (1993) 73 Boston University LR 93
at 104.
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It is submitted that there is a stringent burden on the courts, in particular, the
Constitutional Court to safeguard the right to marry for the following
reasons
(a) The marriage laws are based on stereotypes and prejudices, which
are contrary to human dignity;232
(b) The purpose of the equality section of the Constitution is to
prevent serious infringements ofhuman dignity;233
(c) The nature of the rights seeking to be protected are equality,
privacy, freedom and human dignity;234 and
(d) These rights of equality, human dignity, freedom and privacy are
fundamental to our Constitution and our rights-based legal
order.235
232. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (1998) 3 All SA 26 (W) -
ruled by Heher J: "Constitutionally we have reached a stage ofmaturity in which recognition of the
dignity and innate worth of every member of society is not a matter of reluctant concession, but is
one of easy acceptance ... The Constitution enjoins equal treatment before the law of persons entitled
to its protection. That excludes individual or class discrimination."
233. Prinsloo v Van der Linde (1997) 6 BCLR 759 (CC); Hugo v President ofRepublic of South Africa
(1996) 4 SA 1012 (D).
234. National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
235. Act 108 of 1996 s 7 and s 14.
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It is submitted that a change in the laws to reflect the aspirations of equality,
dignity and respect should not evolve incrementally through the case law but
that these aspirations require adopting and sanctioning by the legislature.
The Roman-Dutch common law of marriage, which was influenced by
Christianity, was imposed on South Africa in 1652 as a result ofDutch
colonialism.236 Though the South African common law ofmarriage has
changed over time, it has consistently retained the characteristic features of
heterosexuality.237
The Constitution is committed to the notion of an inclusive society and the
designated groups in section 9(3)238 who may not be unfairly discriminated
against can no longer be considered outsiders. It is submitted that when the
law recognises heterosexual marriages and not the marriages of groups with
minority sexual inclinations, it is unfairly discriminating against them.
236. P De Vos "On the Legal Construction ofGay and Lesbian Identity and South Africa's Transitional
Constitution" (1996) 12 SAJHR 274 - 275.
237. T.L.Mosikatsana "The Definitional Exclusion of Gays and Lesbians From Family Status" (1996) 12
SAJHR 555.
238. Section 9(3) of the Constitution.
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This creates the perception that they are inferior members of our society. In
introducing the Constitution, the Preamble states that it is the supreme law of
the country, and seeks to establish a society based on democratic values,
social justice and fundamental human rights. It further states that the law
will equally protect every citizen. The state, through the Constitution, will
strive to improve the lives of all citizens and free the potential of each
person.
It is submitted that the Preamble and sections 1 and 9 of the Bill of Rights in
the Constitution, repeatedly affmn the need for the state to provide equal
rights for the post-operative transsexual. This would reassure the citizens of
South Africa that our country belongs to all the people that live in it, united
in our diversity. This most certainly includes groups with minority sexual
inclinations. The prohibition against marriages by post-surgical transsexuals
with persons of their pre-operative sex, is not justified by section 36 of the
Constitution. Accordingly, it is submitted that courts should recognise the
legality of the post-surgical transsexual marriage. Not to do so amounts to
unfair discrimination in contravention of s 9 of the Constitution.239
239. Pantazis op cit 571- same-sex marriages have all the attributes of heterosexual marriages - i.e.
cohabitation, pennanence and fonnality, psychological support and emotional involvement in long-
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4.3.2: THE IMPACT OF "THE PROMOTION OF
EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR
DISCRIMINATION ACT NO. 4 OF 2000" ON
TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES
The Promotion ofEquality and Prevention ofUnfair Discrimination Act240
was passed to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution241 so as to prevent
and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment; to promote equality and
eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and prohibit hate speech; and to
provide for matters connected therewith.242 This Act reinforces the values of
human dignity, equality, freedom and social justice. The Act "endeavours to
facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united in its diversity marked
by human relations that are caring and compassionate,243 and guided by the
principles of equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human
dignity and freedom. ,,244
standing, intimate relationships. Conception is not a requisite of marriage as infertility is not
recognised as legitimate grounds for divorce.
240. Act No.4 of2000.
241. Act No 108 of 1996.
242. Act No. 4 of2000 -Preamble.
243. My emphasis.
244. Act No. 4 of2000 - Preamble.
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The Act defmes "marital status" as including inter alia being in a
relationship "whether with a person of the same or opposite sex, involving a
commitment to reciprocal support in a relationship. ,,245 The Concise Oxford
Dictionary defmition ofmarital is "ofmarriage".246 It is submitted that by
inclusion of same-sex couples in the defmition ofmarital status the state has
recognised marriages of same-sex couples and accordingly, the same should
apply to marriages of post-operative transsexuals to members of their
biological sex.
The Act includes sexual orientation in the defmition of "prohibited grounds"
of discrimination.247 It is submitted that as the Act protects same-sex couples
against unfair discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, this implies a
statutory recognition of their rights including the right to marry of
individuals with minority sexual inclinations, such as the post-operative
transsexual.
245. Act No. 4 of2000 section 1 (xv).
246. Thomas D. (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9ed (1995) 833.
247. Act No. 4 of2000 section 1 (xxii).
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4.3.3: LEGAL CONSEQUENCES: MATTERS
ANCILLARY TO MARRIAGE
The decision in W v W 248 effectively held that post-operative transsexuals
remain members of their initial or former sex. This was despite the relative
irreversible nature of gender reassignment procedures and the fact that
transsexuals would for the rest of their lives retain the appearance of
members of their post-operative sex. The subsequent repeal of section 7B of
the former Births, Marriages, and Deaths Registration Act,249 together with
the decision in W v W have led to specific legal consequences for the post-
operative transsexual. These various legal situations require consideration.
Many of them could be declared unconstitutional.
4.3.3.1: PROPRIETARY CONSEQUENCES OF
MARRIAGE
At present, a marriage contracted between a post-operative transsexual and a
person of the opposite sex is invalid and void ab initio. 250 The nullity of a
void marriage is absolute and produces none of the legal incidents of
248. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
249. Act 81 of 1963.
250. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
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marriage - no obligations are placed on either party concerning maintenance
and the normal division of proprietary rights, as is the case with the
dissolution of a valid marriage.251 This may be unconstitutional.
4.3.3.2: MARRIAGE BY ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT
The validity of an antenuptial contract hinges on the contracting parties
entering into a valid marriage.252 When the transsexual and the other spouse
separate, the intention to keep their respective estates separate as clearly
expressed in the antenuptial contract needs to be respected. 253 If an
antenuptial contract becomes invalid for whatever reason, the proprietary
consequences of the spouses marriage would revert to that of the
community.254 This option is not available in a union involving a transsexual
because the marriage is void ab initio,255 although an application could be
made to declare their relationship a universal partnership.256
251. SALe (1995) op cit 24.
252. H.R.Hahlo The South Afiican Law ofHusband and Wife 5ed (1985) 257.
253. P.M.Gi1son "Gender Dysphoria Syndrome: Medical Aspects and Legal Consequences" (1985) (LLM
Thesis University ofNatal) 218-219.
254. Hahlo op cit 266-267.
255. Hahlo op cit 104~ W v W 1976 (2) SA 1 (A).
256. J.J.Henning, HJ.Delport "Partemership" in W.AJoubert (ed) (1999) vol19 LAWSA 183 at 266.
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4.3.3.3: ACCRUAL REGIME
The accrual regime effects separation of the respective spouses' estates
stante matrimonio and a sharing of the accrual of assets during their
marriage subject to dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce.257 The
sharing of the accrual which the couple contemplated cannot be effected
because it is subject to the dissolution of a marriage by death or divorce.
Because the transsexual's marriage is void ab initio, this consequence of
their antenuptial contract cannot be effected.258
4.3.3.4: COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
Where parties are married in community of property, each spouse's separate
property is vested in a common pool as soon as the marriage takes place
thereby creating the community. As soon as the marriage is concluded, each
spouse becomes the owner of an un-divided half-share of the communal
estate.259 Because the marriage between a post-operative transsexual and a
person of the opposite sex is deemed to be void ab initio, no community is
257. lSinc1air The Matrimonial Property Act(1984) 41.
258. Lupton in Schafer Family Law Service (1995) Jl1.
259. Hahlo op cit 161.
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created, and each spouse is entitled to claim from the common pool what
he/she contributed to it. The respective proportion each party may claim will
be a question of fact. 260 The division of the estate would be as difficult as the
settling of assets of an invalid partnership.261
4.3.3.5: THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
Section 17 of the Child Care Ace62 states that a child may be adopted -
"(a) by a husband and his wife jointly;
(b) by a widower or widow or unmarried or divorced person;
(e) by a married person whose spouse is the parent of the child."
According to the Law Commission263 if two persons, one of whom is a post-
operative transsexual, contracts a purported marriage, no marriage comes
into being and they do not qualify as husband and wife to adopt a child. This
may be viewed as unconstitutional as adoption is only possible to them as
unmarried or divorced persons.
260. Hahlo op cit 103.
261. SALC (1995) op cit 24.
262. Act No. 74 of 1983.
263. SALC (1995) op cit 25.
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4.3.3.6: CONCEPTION OF A CHILD BY ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION OF THE DONOR (AID)
Regulations within the Human Tissue Act264 require that the recipient of
artificial insemination be validly married. 265 Consequently, a woman who is
married to a post-operative transsexual male, is not entitled to the privileges
of AID and therefore, the artificial insemination of the woman would be
illegal. Even if the action took place in the bona fide belief that the marriage
is valid, any child born would be illegitimate with all the attendant adverse
consequences.
The Law Commission gives the example of where the female in such a
marriage previously gave birth to a child by AID. 266 The infertility unit that
she attended was unaware at the time that her marriage was invalid. When
she subsequently returned to the unit to receive artificial insemination for a
second time, she was refused the procedure because the unit had since
learned of the invalidity of her marriage.
264. Act No. 65 of 1983.
265. Regulation 8(1) of the Regulations regarding the Artificial Insemination ofPersons, and Related
Matters, Government Notice No. R.1182 dated 20 June 1986.
266. SALe (1995) op cit 25.
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Section 12(2) of the Constitution267 states that everyone has the right to
psychological and bodily integrity, including the right to make decisions
concerning reproduction and the right to security in and control over their
body. It is submitted it would no longer be illegal for an unmarried person to
be fertilized by AID and the female partner of a post-operative transsexual
male cannot be denied AID as such denial would be unconstitutional.
It is interesting to note that in the United Kingdom section 28(3) of the
Human Fertilization and Embryo Act 1990 allows for conception through
AID when a woman and a man are living together in a stable relationship.
Marriage is not a prerequisite. Where conception is the result of mutually
consensual AID, the man will be regarded for all purposes as the father of
the child.268
The case of X, Y and Z v United Kingdom269 concerned a female to male
transsexual who had been in a stable relationship with a woman for 15 years,
and had had three children by AID. When X applied to the Registrar
267. Act 108 of 1996.
268. Mason and McCall-Smith op cit 48.
269. X, Y and Z v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143, (1998) 39 BMLR 128.
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General to be recognised as the father of the eldest child for the purposes of
registering her birth, his application was refused as the Registrar was of the
opinion that only a biological man could be regarded as father for the
purpose of registration. This decision was upheld by the European Court of
Human Rights which reasoned that as there was no clear consensus among
member states it could not make an exception in a national law of this type
as this could lead to inconsistencies and confusion in family law.270 The
Court, therefore side-stepped the real issue - the recognition of the
transsexual' s post-operative sex. It, however, agreed that the application
raised problems with respect to the granting of parental rights to transsexuals
and the manner in which a social relationship between a child conceived by
AID and the person acting in the role of the father should be defmed by the
law. The decision of the European Court ofHuman Rights contradicts the
objectives of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, which affmns
inter alia that member states have pledged themselves to achieve the
promotion of universal respect for the observance ofhuman rights and
fundamental freedoms. 271
270. Mason and McCall-Smith op cit 48.
271. Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, Preamble.
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4.3.3.7: THE ACTUAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY
The Law Commission states that research has shown that a post-operative
transsexual, who is in possession of an amended birth certificate, has no
difficulty in marrying a biological person of the apparent opposite sex.272
No questions are asked by the marriage officers officiating at these
marriages as they may be unaware of the reassignment surgery or the
decision ofW v W.273
4.3.3.8: COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
In many areas of the law, the dependant of an injured party, is protected and
entitled to compensatory reward for harm suffered by the latter.274 A widow
is entitled to recover damages for loss of support from the person whose
negligent actions caused her husband's death. 275 The sine qua non for this
action is a valid marriage, a fact which would preclude a transsexual's
"wife" from successfully instituting a claim on this ground. 276 This may well
be regarded as unconstitutional.
272. SALC (1995) op cit 25.
273. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
274. D.Singh op cit 38.
275. Fortuin v Commercial Union Ins. Co. 1983 (2) SA 444 (C).
276. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
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Section 17(1) of the Road Accident's Fund Act277 provides for compensation
by the Fund where "any person" has suffered loss of support and
maintenance and loss of services arising from a motor vehicle collision.
"Any person" is not an open-ended description and the claim will only
be considered where there was a legal duty on the deceased to provide
support to the claimant.278 Examples of such relationships include the widow
and children of the deceased, customary unions and husbands and wives.279
In Amod v MMVAF280 dealing with the claim from a widow married in
terms of religious law, Meskin A.J. held:
"It is, and has long been, the law that the duty of support which grounds the
liability which a woman situated as the plaintiff in this case seeks to enforce is a
legal duty of support, the existence ofwhich depends on the existence ofa lawful
marriage between such woman and deceased."
As a marriage between a post-operative transsexual and a member ofhis/her
biological sex is regarded as invalid by the law, the "spouse" of such a
marriage would not be allowed compensation in terms of the Road
277. Act 56 of 1996.
278. D. Singh op cit 39.
279. ibid.
280. Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 (12) BCLR 1716 (D).
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Accidents Fund.
The decision ofRoux J in Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Securitt81 is
relevant at this stage. In Langemaat, a policewoman who had been in a
protracted lesbian relationship sought to have her lover included as her
"dependant" under her medical aid scheme. The court held:
"parties to a same-sex union, which have existed for years in a common home,
must surely owe a duty of support, in all senses to each other" and that:
"section 36 offered the respondents no basis for opposition."
It directed the PolMed Medical Aid Fund to register the lover as a
"dependant."
After taking an apparently progressive stand, the court added that the
decision in the Langamaat case was not a general recognition in respect of
281. Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) SA 312 (T) 317.
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all relationships:
"The Third Respondent [Polmed] will consider every application and make an
appropriate decision on its merits."
It is submitted, however, that in view of the Langemaat decision, a similar
judgement would have been reached had the respondents been parties to a
marriage where one partner was a post-operative transsexual.
4.3.3.9: LAW OF EVIDENCE
Under South African law, in criminal proceedings, a spouse may not be
compelled to disclose any communications which the other made to him/her
during the marriage.282 A similar privilege exists also between ex-spouses in
respect of communications during the subsistence of the marriage
relationship. Hoffman and Zeffert maintain that the rationale for the
privilege is to protect the special trust and confidence that is deemed to exist
between spouses.283
282. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997 section 198.
283. L.H.Hoffinan and D.T.Zeff'ert The South Afrean Law ofEvidence 4ed (1988) 244-245.
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Spouses to a (putative) marriage, where one of the parties is a post-operative
transsexual, do not enjoy the above privileges afforded to the spouses of a
valid marriage by the law of evidence as such a marriage is void ab initio.
4.3.3.10: THE LAW OF SUCCESSION
In terms of the Succession Act284 only the surviving spouse of a (valid)
marriage in or out of community ofproperty, is entitled to succeed
by intestacy to a share ofhislher deceased spouse's estate. Consequently, a
spouse to a putative marriage, where one of the parties is a post-operative
transsexual, cannot succeed by intestacy. Generally, if the surviving spouse
is the only heir, he/she is entitled to the entire inheritance.285
In so far as testate succession is concerned, if the testator bequeathed
property to hislher wifelhusband, then this bequest will be interpreted to
mean the person whom he/ she believed to be hislher wifelhusband at the
time of execution, even if it was subsequently discovered that the marriage
was void. 286 Where specific bequests are concerned, if an heir is described
284. Act No 13 of 1934 section 1.
285. Lupton in Schafer Family Law Service op cit 114.
286. AlIen v Est Bloch 1976 (2) SA 376 (C).
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solely by sex, e.g. where a parent or grandparent has left his/her estate
exclusively to unmarried "sons or grandsons", a post-operative transsexual
male might fmd himself disinherited as legally he remains a member ofhis
biological sex and will not qualify as "son or grandson. ,,287 Conversely a
male transsexual heir, (who has undergone gender reassignment procedures
resulting in a post-operative female), may still inherit as a male. An equally
anomalous situation would apply in a case where a testator bequeaths
property to his/her heirs in different share ratios according to their sexes.288
4.3.3.11: INSURANCE
Institutional insurance schemes like group life insurance, do not generally
cover cohabitees with minority sexual inclinations.289 Such policies are
usually fairly strict and where there is a discretion in respect ofparties living
together, the trend has been to recognise heterosexual cohabitation.290 This
287. sALe (1995) op cit 32.
288. ibid
289. D.Singh op cit 41.
290. ibid.
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would be commensurate with unfair discrimination and therefore
unconstitutional. Certain institutions have sought specific amendments to the
insurance policies but this remains the exception rather than the norm.291
A person has an insurable interest in hislher own life to an unlimited extent,
while a husband/wife has an insurable interest in the life ofhislher spouse to
an unlimited extent as well.292 In these cases the interest is presumed and no
proof of its existence is necessary beyond the existence of a valid
marriage.293 If the marriage is void, the insurer has no legal relationship with
the surviving "spouse" and should not therefore suffer any pecuniary loss as
a result ofhislher death.294 The surviving "spouse" would therefore lose out
on any claims as he/she would not legally be a beneficiary to the insurance
policy. This could be perceived as unconstitutional unfair discrimination.
291.D.Singh op cit 41.
292. ibid.
293. Frullips v General Accident Ins Co of SA Ltd 1983 (4) SA 653 (w).
294. Gilson op cit 228.
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4.4 CRIMINAL LAW
As previously discussed,295 the gender reassignment procedure undertaken
by a male to female transsexual includes the construction in her of a vagina.
The post-operative female is, as indicated above, capable ofhaving sexual
intercourse in the same physical manner as a nonnal biological female.
Similarly, a post-operative male is capable of having sexual intercourse with
a woman. As the law in South Africa does not recognise a post-operative
transsexual's sex, a number of anomalous criminal situations may arise.
4.4.1: INCEST
Incest is defmed as the "unlawful and intentional sexual intercourse between
male and female persons who are prohibited from marrying each other
because they are related within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity,
affmity or adoptive relationships. ,,296
A party to a marriage involving a post-operative transsexual in which there
295. See above.
296. C.R.Snyman Criminal Law 3ed (1995) 335.
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are children, whether by a previous marriage, adoption or artificial
insemination, cannot be convicted of committing the crime of incest with a
such a child.297 The reasons for this are, fIrstly, because the marriage is void
no legally recognised degree of affmity is created between the offending
spouse and the child, and, secondly, the criterion ofunlawfulness required
by the defmition, of incest would not be fulfilled. 298 Therefore there would
be no legal restriction barring the offender from having sexual intercourse
'th hild f h . 299Wl acot at umon.
4.4.2: BIGAMY
Bigamy is defmed as ''unlawfully and intentionally entering into what
purports to be a lawful marriage ceremony with one person while lawfully
married to another. ,,300 Thus a person may be convicted ofbigamy only
where he or she is a party to a subsisting legally valid marriage. This means
that neither spouse of a marriage, where one of the parties is a post-operative
297. JR.Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure 2ed vol2 (1982) 257.
298. ibid.
299. J Taitz "Some Criminal Anomalies Brought About by Sex-Change" (1985) 48 THRHR 97.
If the child were underage the person could be convicted of indecent assault.
300. Milton op cit 245.
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transsexual, can be convicted ofbigamy should either or both spouses enter
into second marriages with another person or persons. Furthermore, a party
to an existing valid marriage cannot be convicted of bigamy should such a
party enter into a second marriage where the other spouse is a post-operative
transsexual.
If, however, the bigamous spouse was not aware that the existing or
subsequent marriage with a post-operative transsexual was void ab initio, the
bigamous spouse may be considered within the rule ofR v Davies301 and
may be convicted of attempted bigamy by attempting to commit the
impossible.
4.4.3: RAPE
The defmition of rape, specifying as it does intentional unlawful sexual
intercourse by a man with a woman without her consene02 means that sexual
301. Rv Davies 1956 (3) SA 32 (A).
302. Milton op cit 257.
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intercourse with a surgically formed female transsexual does not constitute
the crime of rape. 303 A post-operative female may be raped with all the
horror, pain and indignity that would be experienced by a biological female,
but the rapist cannot be convicted of rape so long as the victim is not
regarded in law as a woman. Although the accused may be convicted of
indecent assault, or assault with intent to commit rape or attempted rape,
these offenses are generally not as serious as rape per se. 304 Likewise, even
though it would be physically possible for a post-operative man to rape a
woman, since the "man" is legally protected as a woman, he would not be
guilty of rape but at most he would be guilty of indecent assault. 305
In the 1962 English case of SY v SY (otherwiseW)306 a woman who had had
vaginal atresia307 had undergone surgery for the construction of an
303. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W) - held that a male who is surgically transformed into a female remains a
member of the male sex.
304. SALC (1995) op cit 26.
305. SALC (1995) op cit 26.
306. SYv SY (otherwise W) [1963] P 37, [1962] 3 WLR 526.
307. SY v SY (otherwise W) [1963] P 37, [1962] 3 WLR 526. A consultant obstetrician at the
Addenbrook's Hospital, Cambridge found the individual concerned to have "no or virtually no vagina
and no uterus." with the possibility that she could have had an intersex state.
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an artificial vagina and the court made the following observation:
" If it is to be held that a wife with an artificial vagina is incapable of
consummating her marriage, it can only be on the basis that such
woman is incapable of taking part in true sexual intercourse ... such
a woman might be to a considerable extent beyond the protection of
the criminal law, for it would seem to follow that she would be
incapable in law of being a victim ofrape.,,308
It was held that this conclusion would be "bordering on the fantastic" by
Wilmer J, the dissenting judge who accordingly decided that sexual
intercourse with a woman who had an artificial vagina is ordinary and
natural sexual intercourse (vera copula).309 She could therefore be raped and
the perpetrator accordingly, convicted for the crime of rape.
308. sy v SY (otheIWise)W [1963] P at 60.
309. SYv SY (otheIWise) W [1963] P at 60 - 1.
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The proposed South African Sexual Offenses Bile lO defmes vagina as:
"the whole of the female sexual organ and includes a surgically constructed
vagina."
Should this bill be adopted by Parliament it would afford greater protection
to the post-operative transsexual even though she is not recognised by law as
a woman.
4.4.4: PROSTITUTION AND SOLICITING
Prostitution is defmed as:
"the offering by a woman of her body to indiscriminate lewdness for hire. ,,311
Consequently, a post-operative female who commits acts of prostitution
cannot be convicted of the offense if the law does not regard her as a
woman, notwithstanding the blameworthiness ofher behaviour.312 "She"
310. South African Law Commission Report Sexual Offences: The Substantive Law Project 107
Discussion Paper 85 (1999) 269.
311. J.R.Milton and N.M.Fuller "Statutory Offences" in South African Criminal Law and Procedure
vol 111 (1982) 435.
312. SALC (1995) op cit 27.
104
could, presumably, avoid prosecution for prostitution by assuming her legal
sex, that is, the male sex, for the duration of the trial. 313
The same anomalous situation would apply to a post-operative female
charged with soliciting. A "common prostitute or night walker" may only
commit this crime,314 a calling that may only be practiced by a woman.
Additionally, sections lO(a)-(e) of the Sexual Offenses Ace15 which has as
its objective the protection of the chastity of women in South Africa are not
313. Gilson op cit 244.
314. Milton and Fuller op cit 435.
315. Act 23 of 1957 - according to which, the following are unlawful:
(a) Procuring or attempting to procure any female to have unlawful carnal intercourse with any person
other than the procurer, or in any way assisting in bringing about such intercourse - slO(a).
(b) Enticing any female to a brothel for the purpose of unlawful carnal intercourse or prostitution or
concealing in any house or place any female so enticed - sIO(b).
(c) Procuring or attempting to procure any female to become a common prostitute or inmate of a
brothel- slO(c), and slO(d).
(d) Applying or administering to any female, any drug, intoxicating liquor, matter or thing with intent
to stupefy or overpower her so as thereby to enable any person other than the procurer to have
unlawful carnal intercourse with such female - slO(e).
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applicable to the post-transsexual female and this may be seen as being
unconstitutional.
The English case ofR v Tan316 concerned criminal charges relating to
prostitution. One of the accused, Gloria Greaves, a post-operative female
transsexual, was charged inter alia with contravening the Sexual Offenses
Ace17 which provided that it was an offense for a man knowingly to live
wholly or in part on the earnings ofprostitution.318 This offense could not be
committed by a female which Gloria Greaves and others had considered her
to be for the previous twenty years. She had gone through a marriage
ceremony with a biological male, Brian Greaves who at all times regarded
her as a female.
However, in applying the Ormrod test319 Parker J held that:
" ... both common sense and the desirability of certainty and consistency demand
that the decision in Corbett v Corbett should apply not only for marriage but also
for a charge under S.30 of the Sexual Offences Act... "
316. R v Tan and Others (1983] QBD 1053 (CA).
317. The Sexual Offenses Act 1957.
318. The Sexual Offenses Act 1957 Section 30(1).
319. Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (1970) 2 ALL ER 33.
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Gloria Greaves was convicted and fmed 10,000 pounds. Her petition to the
House of Lords for leave to appeal was rejected. Taitz states that while
"certainty and consistency" may be a convenient tag, it is no substitute for
justice and compassion.320
320. J Taitz "A Transsexual's Nightmare: The Determination of Sexual Identity in English Law" (1988) 2
International Journal ofLaw and the Family 148.
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4.5: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENSES OF GENDER
REASSIGNMENT PROCEDURES IN
SOUTH AFRICA - CONCLUSION
Although gender reassignment operations are not contra bonos mores and
are performed where medically indicated, our law fails to recognise a
transsexual's post-operative sex.
The various legal consequences, outlined above illustrate the anomalous and
sometimes bizarre effect of this failing in our law. The essential legal
consequence of gender reassignment procedures, however, is the
determination of the sexual identity in the post-operative transsexual. In
every situation in which the law recognises a distinction between males and
females, for whatever reason, a party who has undergone gender
reassignment is placed in an anomalous and often unjust situation.
The legal consequences of gender reassignment for interssexuals and little
boys who have suffered penile destruction at an early age are often identical
to the legal consequences resulting from a reassignment of gender for
transsexuals.
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It should be remembered, that a post-operative transsexual takes on the
appearance of a member of the post-operative sex and the actual surgery is
usually irreversible. Because of the decision in W v W321 a post- operative
transsexual remains a member ofhis/her original sex, even though he/she
may be in possession of an amended birth certificate in terms of section 7B
of the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act. 322
Section 9(3) of the Constitution, and the Promotion ofEquality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,323 prohibit unfair discrimination
on the grounds of inter alia "sexual orientation," and section 14 of the
Constitution affmns the "privacy" rights of individuals. Moreover, the
individual's right to 'Just administrative action" is guaranteed in section 33
of the Constitution. It is submitted that these provisions could be used to
clarify the law concerning the consequences of sex change procedures and
thereby assist in resolving the legal anomalies that arise as a result of such
medical management - management that is in accordance with, and does not
go against, public policy.
321. W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
322. Act 81 Of 1963.
323. Act 4 of 2000.
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CHAPTER 5: THE RECOGNITION OF A
TRANSSEXUAL'S POST-OPERATIVE SEX-
COMPARATIVE LAW
The determination of the sexual identity of the post-operative transsexual is
the principle legal consequence of gender reassignment procedures. A
review of the comparative law highlights three distinct legal approaches:324
(a) Some countries325 have resolved the situation by introducing
legislation recognising the transsexual's post-operative sex for all
legal purposes including the law ofmarriage.
(b) In a few countries326, the issue has been determined solely through
administrative processes and a court order may be requisite to
institute the necessary change.
(c) In certain countries327, sexual identity has been determined on an
ad hoc basis by the courts.
324. SALC (1995) op cit 34, which refers to the decisions of the European Court ofHuman Rights
above information~ Rees v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56, [1993] 2 FCR 49, [1987] 2 FLR Ill,
[1987]Fam Law 157, EetHR.
325. For example, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, and The Netherlands.
326. For example, Norway, Portugal and Poland.
327. For example, United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia and South Afiica.
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5.1: RECOGNITION OF THE POST-OPERATIVE
SEX OF A TRANSSEXUAL BY THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
In a number of countries, legislation has been passed recognising the
transsexual's post-operative sex for all purposes of the law, including the
right to marry a member ofhis/her former sex.328 Although the legislative
and administrative requirements for recognition vary from country to
country, in all these countries, medical documentation verifying completion
of treatment is a requisite accompaniment to the application for legal
recognition of a sex change.329
German law requires that the transsexual must be not less than 25 years of
age; the gender reassignment surgery and medical procedures must be
completed; and the transsexual must have lived as a member ofhis/her post-
operative sex for at least three years. 330
328. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Reesjudgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106.
329. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Reesjudgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106.
330. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 16.
See the German legislation on transsexuals of 10 September 1980, BG B1 1980, 1, p1654.
III
In Finland, after completion of the gender reassignment procedures, the
post-operative transsexual is obliged to satisfy a rigorous state-controlled
psychological test. Thereafter, all documents, including details of surgery
are furnished to the Finish Medical Court, which then decides whether the
transsexual's post-operative sex should be recognised by the state.331
Sweden accords legal recognition to the post-operative sex of the transsexual
for all purposes except for marriage, after an application supported by
relevant medical documents is made to a specific administrative authority.
Should the post-operative transsexual wish to marry it is necessary for
him/her to obtain a specific court order.332
In Greece, it is required that before being recognised as a member ofhis/her
post-operative sex, the transsexual must obtain an order of the Supreme
331. Rees Y United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 15.
332. Swedish Act of21 April 1972 -Lag om fastallande ay konstillhorighet i vissa fall- SFS 1972 119;
cfRees Y United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series AN0 106 at
20.
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Court following an application setting out full details of the particular case
supported by medical evidence.333
Other countries that have passed legislation recognising the transsexual's
post-operative sex for all purposes of the law including marriage are
Switzerland,334 The Netherlands,335 Czechoslovakia336 and Italy.337
333. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 16.
334. Documents in Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A
No 106 at 20; see also M.R.Will Geburt Ernes Menschenrechts, Geschlechtsidentitat in Europarecht
Und Staatenintegration (1983) at 911.
335. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 16.
336. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 14.
337. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 17;
see also the Italian Act of 4 May 1982 on the correction of sexual status - Norme in Materia de
Rettificazione Di Attribuzione Di Sessolegge 14 April 1982 - S.Patti and M.R.Will La Rettificazione
Di Attribuzione Di Sesso: Prime Considerazioni (1982).
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5.2: RECOGNITION OF THE POST-OPERATIVE SEX OF
A TRANSSEXUAL BYTHE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS
In certain countries, there is no specific legislation regarding the
determination of the sexual identity of the post-operative transsexual and
recognition here is solely through the administrative pricess.338 Policy
decisions by the respective administrative authorities determine the sexual
identity of post-operative transsexuals. These policy decisions vary between
the different countries and are as follows:
In Norway,339 the administrative procedure must be confmned by executive
ministerial approval. The Central Bureau of Statistics changes the person's
registration number and sex status once medical confmnation of the
completed gender reassignment procedure is furnished to it. A post-
operative transsexual may marry a member ofhis/ her former sex if such a
person is aware of the reassignment procedure.
338. SALC (1995) op cit 37.
339. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 18.
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There is no specific legislation in Portugal where once gender reassignment
is completed a post-operative transsexual's identity documents are amended
upon production of a court order. He/she may then marry a member of
his/her biological sex.340
Gender reassignment is regarded as a purely medical matter in Poland. A
transsexual is required to obtain a court order indicating that he/she is a
genuine transsexual and that the medical procedures have been completed to
enable him/her to become registered as a member ofhis/her post-operative
sex. The individual is then free to marry a member ofhis/her biological
sex.341
340. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 atl8.
341. Rees v United Kingdom European Court HR Rees judgement 17 October 1986 Series A No 106 at 18.
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5.3: RECOGNITION OF THE POST-OPERATIVE SEX OF
A TRANSSEXUAL BY JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
The United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia are similar
to South Africa in that no legislative or administrative processes are
available to deal with the legal recognition of gender reassignment.342 The
courts have been required to determine the sexual identity of a post~
operative transsexual on an ad hoc basis and, in most situations the courts
have refused to acknowledge the validity of the gender reassignment.343
This is possibly because the courts feel bound by long-established legal and
social defmitions of what previously appeared to be immutable conditions,
such as description ofmarriage.344 The subjective view ofjudges towards
transsexualism and homosexuality, and the fear that the recognition of the
transsexual's post-operative sex may possibly open the floodgates to a tide
of single-sex marriages, has probably influenced judicial decisions.
342. SALC (1995) op cit 38.
343. SALC (1995) op cit 38.
344. I.M.Kennedy "Transsexualism and Single-Sex Marriage" (1973) 2 Anglo-American Law Review
112 at 130 et seq: Gail Brent, "Some Legal Problems of the Post-operative Transsexual" (1972-1973)
12 Journal of Family Law 405 at 421.
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5.3.1: UNITED KINGDOM
In the United Kingdom, the leading case ofCorbett v Corbett (otherwise
Ashley)345 which concerned the validity of the marriage in which one of the
partners was a post-operative transsexual has already been discussed.346 In
its alternative judgement, the court held that the marriage was a nullity
because proper consummation between the spouses was not possible.347
The court did not consider the absolute consensus ofmedical evidence that
psychological sex (gender) had to be taken into account when determining
sexual identity. The Law Commission comments that the state erred in fITst
considering the spouses to be of the same sex before considering the subject
of consummation.348 It goes on further to add that there is no doubt that post-
operative transsexuals of either sex are capable of physically consummating
a marriage.349
345. Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 ALL ER 33.
346. See above.
347. Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 ALL ER 33 at 107 F.
348. SALC (1995) op cit 39-40 , a discussion of the Corbett case at 10m and 107G.
349. SALC (1995) op cit 40 footnote 115; in addition, the impact of the Corbett decision on R v Tan and
others [1983] QBD 1053 (CA)has already been discussed above. The simple expediency of the
chromosomal test has led to some unfortunate consequences and demonstrates the dangers of
extrapolating a judicial decision from its true ambience.
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5.3.2: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The case of Rees v United Kingdom,350 had the following facts: The
applicant Rees a post-operative male alleged that the refusal by the
authorities in the United Kingdom to amend his sex description in the birth
register, violated the European Convention ofHuman Rights, in particular,
Article 8 (the right to privacy) and Article 12 (the right to marry). Although
on the particular facts of the case, the European Court of Human Rights
found that the United Kingdom had not violated the European Convention,
the Court added that it:
" ... is conscious of the seriousness of the problems affecting .. . (transsexuals) and
the distress they suffer. .. The need for appropriate legal measures should be kept under
. ,,351
reVIew....
It is of significance that the European Commission ofHuman Rights352 in its
initial examination of the case found it necessary to refer to the case of Van
350.Rees v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56, [1993] 2 FCR 49, [1987] 2 FLR Ill, [1987]Fam Law
157, EctHR.
351. As quoted by the SALC (1995) op cit 41.
352. Allegations ofviolations of the European Convention ofHuman Rights are considered first by the
European Commission ofHuman Rights and may then be referred to the European Court ofHuman
Rights by the Commission. (see page 41 of SALC (1995) Report).
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Oostewijck v Belgium353 by stating that Belgium, in refusing to
acknowledge Van Oostewijck's post-operative sex had violated Article 8 of
the European Convention of Human Rights, that is, respect for private and
and family life. Belgium had refused:
" ... to recognise an essential element of his personality: his sexual identity
resulting from his changed physical form, his physical makeup and his social
role. In doing so, it (Belgium) treats him as an ambiguous being, an
"appearance", disregarding in particular the effects of lawful medical treatment
aimed at bringing the physical sex and psychical sex into accord with each other
... it restricts an applicant to a sex which now can scarcely be regarded as his
own.,,354
In 1990 in Cossey v United Kingdom355 the European Court ofHuman
Rights was effectively asked to overturn the Rees decision. Although it did
353. Van Oostewijck v Belgium (1986) 3 EHRR 557. This case was not referred to the European Court of
Human Rights for a decision as the applicant had not exhausted his domestic remedies. However this
case is similar to the Rees case where Van Oostewijck, a post-operative male, had been refused by
authorities in Belgium to have his sex description in his birth register altered.
354. Van Oostewijck v Belgium 3 EHRR 557 at 584.
355. Cossey v United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622, [1991] 2 FLR 492; Cossey, a male to female
conversion's application to the ECHR that the United Kingdom had violated her rights to privacy and
marriage, although not upheld was viewed more sympathetically than the Rees application.
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not do so, this time the court engaged a more compassionate approach to the
difficulties experienced by Cossey. The fundamental reasons for this shift in
opinion are to be found probably in the dissenting opinions ofMartins J.
who based his opinion largely on the changing societal attitudes to activities
that are essentially private and the fact that the court in Rees had left the
door open to accommodate scientific and societal changes in the future. 356
He suggested that the treatment of the syndrome was incomplete without full
recognition of the new status.
Again, in Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom357 the European Court
ofHuman Rights decided in favour of the United Kingdom in relation to a
violation of Article 8. The applicant, who had been married as a man and
had a daughter by that marriage was a pilot and was unable to obtain
employment in her new sex. However, the court declared that there had been
no new developments in the field that would induce them to overturn
Cossey. The United Kingdom was, nevertheless, strongly criticized for not
having kept its legal measures in this area under review.
356. Mason and McCall-Smith op cit 43.
357. Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom [1998] 3 FCR 141, [1998] 2 FLR 928, ECHR.
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A further application has been upheld by the European Commission. The
case concerns I v United Kingdom.358 Here, the applicant, a male to female
conversion contended that the failure to supply a replacement certificate of
current gender placed her at risk inter alia ofbeing unable to re-register as a
nurse and ofbeing placed in a male hospital ward or male prison. She also
maintained that she could marry neither a woman nor a man.
The European Court ofHuman Rights is to be criticized for not taking a fmn
conclusive stand in earlier cases and fmality on the legality of
acknowledgement and acceptance of a post-operative transsexual's sex is
awaited.
B v France 359 concerned an appeal to the European Court ofHuman Rights
against a refusal of the Cour de Cassation, fIrst to declare that following
surgery, B, a former male was now of female sex and, second, to alter her
documentation accordingly. The refusal was largely based on the grounds
that she was still biologically male. Mason and McCall-Smith notes that the
358. I v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 66, ECHR.
359. B v France (1992) 16 EHRR 1, [1992] 2 FLR 492.
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regulation of reassignment operations is stricter in France than in the United
Kingdom.360
B's appeal was upheld on the grounds that Article 8 (the right to privacy)
had been violated largely because in the French system, a person's sex is
constantly publicized by way of hislher social security number and that, as a
result, B found herself in a position that was incompatible with the respect
due to her private life.
5.3.3: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The United States of America is one of the countries where ad hoc decisions
are taken by the courts with respect to the detennination of the transsexual's
post-operative sex. In their decisions regarding marriages, the US courts
appear to have shown a greater understanding of the transsexual problem
than their counterparts in England.361 In the case ofMT v JT362 the Court
rejected the decision in Corbett v Corbett and the attendant Ormrod test.
360. Mason and McCa11-Smith op cit 43.
361. Mason and McCall-Smith op cit 42.
362. MT v JT 355 (A) LR (2d) 204 (1976).
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It held that a post-operative transsexual may in law be recognised as a
member of his post-operative sex where the anatomical and genital features
were made to conform to that person's gender, psyche or psychological sex,
i.e. sexual identity was governed by a congruence of those standards.363 The
following statement by the court demonstrates the rationale of the decision:
"A transsexual in a proper case can be treated medically by certain supportive
measures and through surgery to remove and replace existing genitalia with sex
organs which coincide with the person's gender. If such sex reassignment surgery
is successful and the post-operative transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment
thereby possessed of the full capacity to function as a male or female, as the case
may be, we perceive no legal barrier, recognizable social taboo or reason
grounded in public policy to prevent the person's identification at least for the
purpose of marriage to the sex finally indicated. ,,364
363. MT v IT 355 (A) LR (2d) 204 (1976) at 209.
364. MT v IT 355 (A) LR (2d) 204 (1976) at 210.
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5.3.4: AUSTRALIA
The decision of the courts in the Australian case of In the Marriage of C and
D (falsely called C)365 was that the marriage ofMr. C, an intersexual who
had corrective sexual alignment surgery resulting in the male phenotype,
was not valid because Mr. C was neither a man nor a woman. In refusing to
regard Mr. C as either male or female, in spite of the medical procedures, the
Australian court indicated once again, the dangers of leaving the
determination of sexual identity to ad hoc decisions by the court.
365. In the Marriage ofC and D (falsely called C) 3 EHRR 557 at 584.
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5.4: THE RECOGNITION OF A TRANSSEXUAL'S POST-
OPERATIVE SEX - COMPARATIVE LAW:
CONCLUSION
From the above study of comparative law with respect to the determination
of the sexual identity of the post-operative transsexual, it is clear that in
countries where legislation has been passed regarding the recognition of the
transsexual's or intersexual's post-operative sex, the difficulties and unjust
anomalies regarding the legal consequences have been satisfactorily
removed. This also applies to those countries where the sexual identity of the
post-operative transsexual is determined by the administrative process.
The greatest impediments to the recognition of the post-operative sex of the
transsexual appear where the legal status of the individual is left to the court
to decide on an ad hoc basis. Here judges and magistrates play an important
role in determining legal outcome. It is important to remember that their
personalities, schooling, university education, professional experience,
personal political beliefs and their background in general influence the way
in which they interpret legislation.366
366. Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre To End Violence Against Women National Legal Manual For
Counsellors OfRaped And Battered Women (1999) 140.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE TRANSSEXUAL'S
POST-OPERATIVE STATUS
Medical science has progressed and continues to do so at a rapid pace.
Medical men and women have succeeded in carrying out gender
reassignment procedures for the therapeutic benefit of their patients. The
law, however, by keeping aloof of the transsexual's problem, has created a
legal "vacuum" where there is social and judicial acceptance of
reassignment procedures but a refusal to give legal effect to the change in
status that the transsexual obsessively desires and the operation simulates. A
legal recognition of the change in sex is essential for the post-operative
transsexual to be totally assimilated into society and to avoid being
constantly harmed by traumatic experiences.
The South African Law Commission conducted an investigation into the
legal consequences of sexual realignment and related matters. This
investigation, together with the recommendations and proposed legislation,
the aim ofwhich was to alleviate the resultant difficulties and legal
anomalies faced by the post-operative transsexual was submitted to the then
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Minister of Justice, for consideration in 1995.367 The Commission's
recommended legislation is as follows: 368
"1.(1) Any person whose sex organs have been altered by surgical and medical
treatment so that such person has the sex organs of the sex opposite to his or her
biological sex may apply to the Director-General ofHome Affairs for the
alteration of his or her sex description in the birth register in order to bring it into
line with his or her altered sex organs."
The amendment of a person's sex description in the birth register would be
an administrative process that would be handled by the Director-General of
Home Affairs and not left to the ad hoc decisions by the courts. Legal
certainty with respect to such alteration would thereby be affmned.
"1.(2) An application contemplated in subsection (1) shall be accompanied by-
(a) the birth certificate of the applicant;
(b) reports from the medical practitioners who carried out the processes
and applied the treatment to alter the sex organs of the applicant,
stating the nature of those processes and treatment and the results
thereof; and
367. SALC (1995) op cit i.
368. SALC (1995) op cit 76-78.
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(c) a report concerning the present sex appearance of the applicant by a
medical practitioner who did not take part in any ofthe processes or
the treatment of the applicant to alter his or her sex appearance, but
who has medically examined the applicant in order to establish his or
her sex appearance."
This would serve as adequate evidence that the process was necessary and
has been completed. As the diagnosis and treatment of the gender dysphoria
syndrome is a medical matter, it would be the task of the medical team to
decide on whom and under what circumstances the gender reassignment
surgery would be performed. Having to furnish the necessary reports to the
Director-General ofHome Affairs with the application would act as a
safeguard to ensure that the management decision would not be taken
lightly.
"1.(3) The Director-General ofHome Affairs must, if he refuses to alter the sex
description of the applicant in the birth register, furnish reasons for the decision in
writing to the applicant unless the reasons have been made public."
The Director-General would need to justify his/her decision for declining the
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application (eg. incomplete or inadequate reports or inconsistent medical
reports from the medical practitioners). This would be in keeping with
section 33369 of the Constitution.
"1.(4) If an application contemplated in subsection (1) is refused by the Director-
General, the applicant may apply to the magistrate of the district in which he or
she resides for an order directing the change of his or her sex description."
This would provide for a review of the administrative action by the
magistrate and would be in accord with the applicant's constitutional
rightS. 370 It is trite that it is much cheaper to make an application in a
magistrate's court than in the high court.
"1.(5) An application contemplated in subsection (4) shall be accompanied by the
documents mentioned in subsection (2) and the reasons why the Director-General
refuses to amend the sex description in the birth register."
369. Act 108 of 1996 s 33 (2) - "Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative
action has the right to be given written reasons."
370. Act 108 of 1996 s 33 (3)(a) - National legislation must "provide for the review of administrative
action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;". The Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of2000 has now been passed to give effect to this constitutional right.
129
The magistrate would not be able to make an appropriate decision without
all the necessary documents and the reasons for the refusal from the
Director-General. The grounds for a reversal of the Director- General's
decision could be ego a misinterpretation of the information in the documents
- hence the need for all the necessary documents and information from the
Director-General.
"1.(6) The applicant shall on the date and at the time determined by the magistrate
appear in person before the magistrate in chambers and shall at the request of the
magistrate furnish the additional information and proof which the magistrate
requires. "
The decision to alter the sex description in the birth register would be taken
only after scrupulous review and scrutiny of the application by the
magistrate. It is significant that the applicant appear in person before the
magistrate as it might be necessary for the magistrate to observe the physical
changes in the post-operative transsexual in order to ascertain that the
procedure has been completed. Where the submitted medical reports are not
consistent or where the magistrate is in doubt with respect to the medical
results, it may be necessary for an independent medical practitioner
appointed by the court to examine the applicant. It is suggested that section
130
1(6) make provision for the inclusion of the independent medical
practitioner. That the alteration of the sex description is to be allowed would
be beyond any doubt.
"1.(7) If the application is granted the magistrate shall issue an order directing the
Director-General to alter, in accordance with the order, the sex description in the
birth register of the person named in the order."
This section ensures that the applicant's right to administrative action that is
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair would be respected. 371
"1.(8) An applicant may on his or her appearance before the magistrate be assisted
by a legal representative."
This would ensure that any substantial injustice that might otherwise result
as a consequence of the applicant's lack ofknowledge of the legal processes
would be avoided. Where the applicant cannot afford to employ the services
of a private lawyer, he/she could apply to legal aid for assistance.
371. Act 108 Of 1996 s 33 (1).
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"2.(1) If the Director-General ofHome Mfairs grants an application contemplated
in section 1(1) or receives an order from a magistrate as contemplated in
section 1(4), he or she shall in accordance with the provisions of section
24A of the Births and Death Registration Act, 1992 (Act No. 51 of 1992),
have the sex description of the person concerned altered and such person
shall from the date of the recording of such alteration be legally deemed for
all purposes to be a person of the sex description so ordered."
The post-operative transsexual would no longer be subjected to repeated
humiliating explanations in an attempt to resolve uncertainty, as there would
now be legal certainty. He/she would be fully integrated into society as a
member of his/her post-operative sex. Hence there would be no discrepancy
between hislher apparent sex and hislher registered sex.
This section, however, makes no provision for the retrospective alteration of
the sex description of the post-operative transsexual who has had surgery
subsequent to the repeal of section 7 B of the Births, Marriages and Deaths
Registration Act.372 The individual may, at present, be in a purported
marriage. It is suggested that this section be altered so as to include these
individuals.
372. Act 81 of 1963.
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"2.(2) Rights and obligations that have been acquired by or accrued to the said
person before the alteration ofhis or her sex description or the date of the
order shall not be abolished by the alteration or by the order."
An annulment of the rights and obligations obtained during hislher previous
sex would be perceived as unfair discrimination and hence be
unconstitutional,373 ego where the individual has inherited as a member of
hislher previous sex, the right to inheritance would prevail. However, this
section requires clarification as ego the right to marry a member ofhislher
previous sex, is at present denied the post-operative transsexual. Section 2(2)
may in effect not assist in the retrospective achievement of all rights due to
the post-operative transsexual.
"3. The Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1992 (Act No. 51 of 1992), is hereby
amended by the insertion of the following section after section 24:
'24A Alteration of sex description
The Director-General may in terms of section 2 of the Alteration of Sex
373. Act 108 of 1996 s 9.
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Description and Sex Status Act, 19 ... (Act No.... of 19 ... ), order that the sex
description ofa person be altered in the birth register. An alteration so recorded
shall be dated and after the recording of the said alteration the person concerned
shall be entitled to be issued with an amended birth certificate. '"
Gender reassignment procedures are not considered as contra bonos mores
by the state. The state already implicitly recognises that such procedures are
accepted medical treatment, although not a priority. Post-operative
transsexuals should be able to obtain official documents indicating their
post-operative sex with no reference to their former sex. Where social and
commercial practices require the production of a birth certificate, the post-
operative transsexual should not be placed in the humiliating situation of
having to explain hislher predicament. The recommendations of the Law
Commission attempt to achieve this.
Although these recommendations were submitted to the Minister of Justice
in 1995, five years later, the South African legal system has remained
indifferent to the Law Commission's recommendations and no legal
response has, as yet, been forthcoming. This is probably because legislative
issues of greater import have been given priority during the transformation
process in post-apartheid South Africa. However, more than four years have
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elapsed since the adoption of the fmal Constitution.374 It is essential that the
constitutional rights of all citizens are protected and that legislative measures
designed to safeguard the rights of the post-operative transsexual are
enacted.
(The recommendations of the Law Commission together with the suggestions
of the present author ensure that the determination of a post-operative
transsexual's identity is not left to ad hoc decisions by the courts, but are
resolved by legislation. The question ofwho undergoes the gender
reassignment procedure is a medical concern, and the determination of
sexual identity is a medical problem. These are complex scientific issues, not
suitable for ad hoc judicial decisions. The latter are neither in the interest of
the public nor the transsexual. The refusal by the courts to recognise the new
status of the individual after gender reassignment surgery has done little to
solve this modem medical and sociological problem.
In South Africa, the number of transsexuals fmding themselves in this legal
limbo after surgery may be greater than actually recorded. This was revealed
374. Act 108 of 1996.
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in a recent report by the Mail and Guardian.375 The law should not disregard
reality. The reality is that:
(a) there are transsexuals (both pre-operative and post-operative) in
our society;
(b) it is possible to change their physical appearance so that they can
be accepted as members of their changed sex; and
(c) such persons are prepared to undergo these procedures even
though they cost more than RIOO 000,376 are extremely
dangerous377 and are not recognised by the law.
Accordingly, not only is the legal position no longer in keeping with reality,
but a refusal of its legal recognition and its consequences, undermines the
purpose of the operation and its therapeutic aims.
375. P .Kirk "Mutilation by the Military" Mail and Guardian July 28 to August 3 2000 4 - 5.
376. Kirk op cit at 5 states: "In civilian life, such operations cost more than RIOO 000 and are not
performed in state hospitals."
377. Kirk op cit at 5 states that the operations are extremely dangerous and the program at one
provincial hospital was halted after a number ofpatients died from complications.
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Transsexuals undergo dangerous and mutilating surgery for therapeutic
purposes in the hope that they will become integrated and responsible
members of society. At the conclusion of this treatment, however, they fmd
that they are not recognised by law as members of their new sex.
Green378 has asked the following questions:
"What does it comfort any of us to insist that an individual shall be a man, when
for all purposes of the ordinary life that individual can only be, and be
recognised, as a woman? What pride can there be for a law which vetoes the
attitudes dictated by ordinary humanity?"
It is a blatant act ofunconstitutional discrimination against such individuals
if the law continues to refrain from recognising their gender change.
Constitutional safeguards of the individual's rights379 together with the
protectio~ afforded to the individual by the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,380 make it unlikely that the
common law decision in W v W would be upheld in present day, post-
378. D.A.R. Green "Transsexuals and Marriage" (1970) 120 New Law Joumal210.
(!79. ct 108 of 1996 s 9 (equality), s 10 (human dignity), s 12(2) (bodily and psychological integrity), s 14
(privacy), s 33 Gust administrative action).
380. Act 4 of 2000.
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apartheid South Africa. Although medico-Iegal and morality issues have
addressed the treatment of the transsexual it is now necessary for the
judiciary to address social policy issues involved in advancing the post-
operative transsexual's basic human rights.
Where there is no legislation to guide their decisions concerning the most
modem, sophisticated medical procedures, the courts are placed in an
invidious position of having to seek guidance in defmitions and descriptions
that were established during ancient law periods when the only criteria were
humankind's personal experience concerning biological phenomena.
I Certainty and consistency may be comfortable criteria on which to base
judgements. However, in doing so, in respect of the post-operative
transsexual, the law alienates itself from compassion and justice.
The legislation recommended by the Law Commission, together with the
suggestions of the present writer, should be introduced as a matter of
urgency to secure the fundamental rights of post-operative transsexuals.
Such legislation would protect not only the transsexual who has had gender
reassignment procedures but also the intersexual who has had gender
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assignment surgery and the little boy who has had penile amputation at an
early age.
It is recommended that the legislature should take immediate steps to ensure
that the results of reassignment procedures of a therapeutic nature that are
legally performed are legally recognised.
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